Business Models for Prosumers in Europe by Hall, S et al.
 
 
 
 
This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement N°764056. The sole responsibility for the content of this document lies 
with the authors. It does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the funding authorities. The funding authorities 
are not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein. 
 
 
 
 
 
Prosumers for the Energy Union: mainstreaming 
active participation of citizens in the energy transition 
 
 
 
 
Business Models for Prosumers in Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
Deliverable 4.1 of the Horizon 2020 PROSEU project (H2020-LCE-2017) 
Grant Agreement N°764056 
 
Prosumers for the Energy Union 
PROSEU D4.1– Business Models for Prosumers in Europe   2 / 92 
 
 
 
Lead partner for 
deliverable 
University of Leeds 
Document type Report 
Due date of deliverable 31.12.2019 
Actual submission date 30.12.2019 
Dissemination level Public (PU) 
Authors (s) Stephen Hall, Donal Brown, Mark Davis (University of Leeds), 
Moritz Ehrtmann, Lars Holstenkamp (Leuphana University of 
Lüneburg)  
 
Reviewer (s) Kristian Petrick (Eco-Union); Inês Campos (FC.ID) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cite as: Hall, S., Brown, D., Davis, M., Ehrtmann, M., Holstenkamp, L., (2020) Business Models for 
Prosumers in Europe. PROSEU - Prosumers for the Energy Union: Mainstreaming active participation of 
citizens in the energy transition (Deliverable N°D4.1).  
Prosumers for the Energy Union 
PROSEU D4.1– Business Models for Prosumers in Europe   3 / 92 
Summary of PROSEU 
PROSEU aims to mainstream the renewable energy Prosumer phenomenon in the European 
Energy Union. Prosumers are active energy users who both consume and produce energy from 
renewable sources (RES). The growth of RES Prosumerism all over Europe challenges current 
energy market structures and institutions. PROSEU’s research focuses on collectives of RES 
Prosumers and will investigate new business models, market regulations, infrastructural 
integration, technology scenarios and energy policies across Europe. The team will collaborate 
with RES Prosumer Initiatives (Living Labs), policymakers and other stakeholders from nine 
countries, following a quasi-experimental approach to learn how RES Prosumer communities, 
start-ups and businesses are dealing with their own challenges, and to determine what 
incentive structures will enable the mainstreaming of RES Prosumerism, while safeguarding 
citizen participation, inclusiveness and transparency. Moving beyond a case by case and 
fragmented body of research on RES Prosumers, PROSEU will build an integrated knowledge 
framework for a socio-political, socioeconomic, business and financial, technological, socio-
technical and socio-cultural understanding of RES Prosumerism and coalesce in a 
comprehensive identification and assessment of incentive structures to enable the process of 
mainstreaming RES Prosumers in the context of the energy transition. 
Summary of PROSEU’s Objectives  
• Objective 1: Document and analyse the current state of the art with respect to (150-200) 
RES Prosumer initiatives in Europe. 
• Objective 2: Identify and analyse the regulatory frameworks and policy instruments relevant 
for RES Prosumer initiatives in nine participating Member States. 
• Objective 3: Identify innovative financing schemes throughout the nine participating Member 
States and the barriers and opportunities for RES Prosumer business models. 
• Objective 4: Develop scenarios for 2030 and 2050 based on in-depth analysis of technological 
solutions for RES Prosumers under different geographical, climatic and socio-political 
conditions. 
• Objective 5: Discuss the research findings with 30 relevant stakeholders in a Participatory 
Integrated Assessment and produce a roadmap (until 2030 and 2050) for mainstreaming 
RE Prosumerism. 
• Objective 6: Synthesise the lessons learned through experimentation and co-learning within 
and across Living Labs. 
• Objective 7: Develop new methodological tools and draw lessons on how the PROSEU 
methodology, aimed at co-creation and learning, can itself serve as an experiment with 
institutional innovation. 
• Objective 8: Create an RES Prosumer Community of Interest. 
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Executive Summary 
Introduction 
This report explores the different business models being adopted to enable renewable energy 
generation and self-consumption in the European Union. Individuals, businesses and energy 
communities that install renewable energy generation and self-consume some of that 
generation are called ‘prosumers’. Prosumers may be householders, businesses or communities 
whose primary business is not energy generation.  
The price of installing on site renewables is falling, which means homes and businesses can 
increasingly afford the up-front cost of installing a system. At the same time, governments are 
removing the subsidies formerly paid to prosumers for feeding renewable energy into the grid. 
In parallel, energy systems are getting smarter, so it is becoming easier to account for smaller 
and smaller amounts of energy and to trade them between smaller players in the energy 
market; even down to household to household trades.  
The recent Clean Energy Package (CEP) for All Europeans enshrines the rights of European 
citizens to become individual and/or collective prosumers. Collective prosumers are defined in 
the Clean Energy Package by two new types of organisation; Renewable Energy Communities 
and Citizen Energy Communities who are empowered to generate, use and to sell energy 
collectively, between themselves. How these Renewable Energy Communities (RECs) and 
Citizen Energy Communities (CECs) are established in each Member State (MS) is a matter for 
each MS’s energy policy and regulation.  
This report explores why these RECs and CECs are necessary, what kinds of value they might 
be trying to capture in the energy transition, and how they can be empowered through MS’ 
energy policy and regulation. To do this we investigated the business models being adopted 
by individual and collective prosumers.  
Research 
The research team undertook research effort in seven countries, engaging 84 stakeholders 
from across the energy value chain: citizens, businesses, utilities, regulators, researchers, 
innovators and financiers. We used business model collaboration workshops, expert semi-
structured interviews, and desk research to investigate the business models being adopted by 
individual and collective prosumers. This research produced 25 business model ‘archetype’ 
diagrams; representations of how energy, energy services, payments, data, and ‘balancing’ 
services flow around the system. 
We subsequently focussed on 15 of these business models that were either in the market, in a 
trial phase, or in the development phase. We used these business model archetypes diagrams 
to question how each model solves problems for prosumers and other stakeholders. In each 
case we identified what values are being captured and by whom. We then used 10 ‘key 
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principles of prosumerism’ to explore how each model pays for energy networks, if they avoid 
or pay energy taxes, and whether they can generate new revenues by offering system flexibility 
or decarbonising other energy vectors. 
Results 
We found that collective prosumer business models in the market, or close to market, were 
extending the definition of self-consumption in diverse ways. In Germany, a Landlord-to-
Tennant energy model allows for a form of self-consumption from solar PV on multi-occupancy 
buildings. In the UK, private wire networks are allowing prosumers to experiment with different 
energy technologies that both maximize self-consumption and offer services to grid operators. 
In the Netherlands, co-operatives can ‘collectively’ self-consume renewable energy from 
adjacent post codes. And in Spain, a new Royal Decree allows residents in multi-occupancy 
buildings and local communities to establish ‘collective auto-consumption’ models that the 
local grid operator enables by close management of prosumers meter data. Figure 1 shows the 
simplified German Mieterstrom model.  
Figure 1: Simplified Landlord Tennant Electricity model, ‘Mieterstrom’.  
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By presenting 15 prosumer business models in this way, we can explore how each model 
benefits from avoiding different elements of the retail price of energy, or from earning new 
revenues either from flexibility of from decarbonising other energy vectors.  
We found several models seek to ‘aggregate’ prosumers’ flexibility and use the flexibility of 
many small energy systems to service bigger needs of electricity system operators. The Clean 
Energy Package also empowers these business models by directing MS governments to open 
up flexibility markets to these smaller scale aggregators.  
We found collective prosumer business models that derive value from energy efficiency retrofit 
or decarbonisation of other energy vectors such as heat and transport. Each of these business 
models is assessed for its compatibility with the 10 ‘key principles of prosumerism’ set out in 
the report.  
Analysis 
By comparing each business model, we found that there are multiple ways of extending the 
definition of ‘self-consumption’ and for prosumers to earn new revenues in the energy market. 
We also found that individual business models do not necessarily travel well between MS. The 
differences in extant system regulation, the retail price of energy, and the underlying renewable 
resources of wind and sun in each nation, along with the different stages or energy market 
development, make each prosumer business model an almost bespoke solution to each MS.  
To tackle this, we have explored exactly where each MS has made regulatory space for these 
prosumer business models. In the Netherlands, specific tax breaks for co-operative prosumers 
have been secured. In the United Kingdom, a derogation from the need for an energy supply 
license is made for supply under 2.5MW. In Spain, the collation of meter data by the distribution 
operator is the enabling factor.  
In each case prosumer business models are finding new ways of breaking out of a ‘niche’ and 
trying to enter the mainstream or ‘regime’ of the energy market. We use a set of theories based 
in evolutionary economics and socio-technical systems thinking to show how some prosumer 
business models may exist alongside the existing energy regime, while some may pose a 
challenge to it. We make clear that while each of the business models explored is trying to 
build a business case, the reason for their existence in the energy market is often non-profit 
driven.  
We conclude by asking how MS policymakers and regulators tasked with transposing the Clean 
Energy Package into law can empower RECs and CECs. We ask whether MS regulators only 
exist to remove barriers to participation in utility dominated energy markets, or whether they 
can do more to protect and empower the ‘collective prosumer niche’, given its wider social, 
economic and environmental value. The challenge is to establish what it is that Renewable 
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Energy Communities and Citizens Energy Communities can do, that a private for-profit 
company in the energy system cannot do.   
We split these policy options between (1) ‘fit and conform’ options, which would bring RECs 
and CECs into direct competition with commercial actors in the energy market by reducing 
barriers to entry; and (2) ‘stretch and transform’ policy options, which empower collective 
prosumer business models by allowing the niche to grow through tax, subsidy and regulatory 
advantages that RECs and CECs can access but commercial actors cannot. See Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Two streams of policy options for empowering the prosumer niche 
‘Fit and Conform’ policy options for 
empowerment of the prosumer niche 
‘Stretch and Transform’ policy options for the 
prosumer niche 
Opening up balancing, ancillary services and capacity 
markets to smaller scale demand side response. 
Opening up balancing, ancillary services and 
capacity markets to smaller scale demand side 
response and reserve a portion of each auction for 
REC and CEC participation.  
Create an export guarantee that obliges retail 
suppliers to offer a price above zero for energy 
exported to the grid.  
Create an export guarantee that obliges retail 
suppliers to offer a price above zero for energy 
exported to the grid. 
Experiment with derogations from supplier licensing 
under certain power ratings for all stakeholders.  
Experiment with derogations from supplier licensing 
under certain power ratings only for RECs and CECs 
Allow peer-to-peer platforms to operate without 
supplier license requirements when partnered with a 
licensed utility.  
Allow peer-to-peer platforms and Local Energy 
Companies to operate without supplier license 
requirements when partnered with a licensed utility. 
Expose prosumers to full costs of network utilisation  Maintain limited protection from full costs of 
network utilisation 
Create a specific scheme for shared self-consumption 
in multi-occupancy buildings or in very local 
geographies that benefits from tax incentives or 
explicitly justifies avoidance of network charges or 
supplier costs.  
Create a specific scheme for shared self-
consumption in multi-occupancy buildings or in very 
local geographies that benefits from tax incentives 
or explicitly justifies avoidance of network charges 
or supplier costs. Where only REC and CEC 
organisational forms can operate the scheme 
 Re-establish explicit subsidies for prosumers where 
the prosumer business model used includes other, 
hard to decarbonise energy vectors such as heat or 
transport.  
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These policy options are developed as the main report progresses; future work by the PROSEU 
consortium will engage MS regulators and policy makers in how these two sets of options for 
empowering the prosumer niche can be transposed into energy policy and market regulation.  
Introduction 
1.1 Objectives of this report 
This report describes the business models being created by citizens to accelerate the energy 
transition. EU citizens and communities are moving away from being passive ‘consumers’ of 
energy. They are creating new ways to generate, use and trade renewable energy - this is 
‘prosumerism’. This report explores how reduced or eliminated energy subsidies mean new 
business models are needed to make prosumerism work. We show how common challenges 
across European Union MS are being met by a diverse set of prosumer business models. The 
objective of the report is therefore to understand what new business models are needed to 
mainstream prosumerism and how well they integrate into different energy marketsi.  
We used to think of prosumers as individual households with solar panels or other small 
renewable technologies, but recently the term has been extended to prosumer “communities”. 
These are citizen led renewable energy projects, they might include homes, businesses, 
neighbourhoods or commercial sites. These ‘communities’ generate, use and trade renewable 
energy. It is true that prosumer communities have existed for some time; what is new however, 
is that the rights of these communities to enter the energy market are now enshrined in EU law 
under the Clean Energy Package1 in the second Renewable Energy Directive (REDII)2 and the 
Electricity Markets Directive3. 
This is new because in most MS, the rights of citizens to act together in the energy market have 
been ambiguous4. It has been unclear whether electricity generated on site can be traded 
between households or in a multi-occupancy block. It has been (and still is in many Member 
States) unclear how to sell a co-operative’s electricity directly to its own members. It has been 
unclear how to account for small scale, distributed renewable energy that ‘spills’ onto the grid 
when its owners are not using it ‘behind the meter’. In short it has been unclear how this 
generation can be accounted for in the market. This matters because it is difficult to match 
when renewables are generating with when a householder or business is using electricity. What 
to do with the excess, and how it is accounted for, can make the difference between sustainable 
and unsustainable business models. 
 
i It is a substantive contribution to PROSEU Objective 3: Identify innovative financing schemes throughout the nine 
participating Member States and the barriers and opportunities for RES Prosumer business models. 
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Energy systems across the European Union are becoming smarter - where smaller units of 
energy can be measured and used more accurately and cheaply. This means it becomes more 
realistic to account for and exchange smaller units of energy even down to the household scale. 
Barriers to entry are reduced because the cost of smarter renewable technologies are 
decreasing at the same time as a legal framework evolves to use them in new collectiveii ways.  
We investigated how these trends lead to new prosumer business models in 7 MS. We ran 
business model co-production workshops, documentary analysis and research interviews in the 
United Kingdom, Germany, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Belgium and Croatia. We present 
the results of this research effort by defining common problems for consumers, system 
operators, and MS governments, then mapping these problems onto each business model to 
understand how different subsidies, revenues and savings can be captured by prosumers. We 
conclude with recommendations for European energy policy and regulation on how the 
prosumer ‘niche’ can be better empowered.  
In order to discuss business models, prosumer ‘niches’ and different values in the energy 
system, we first need a common set of terms and understandings which we take from three 
fields of academic theory.   
1.2 Three academic approaches to understand the ‘mainstreaming’ of 
collective prosumers. 
We use three fields of academic analysis to address our research objective. These are 
Transitions Management, a Multi Actor Perspective and Business Model Co-evolution. These 
are critical foundations for later analysis as they explain why and how prosumer business 
models may or may not be able to mainstream in the EU energy system. This moves us beyond 
simple identification of individual legislative ‘barriers’, which even if removed may still be 
insufficient to mainstream or empower collective prosumerism.  
1.2.1 Sustainability Transitions and Transition Management 
The Transitions Management school explores how large socio-technical systems like energy, 
transport and water change over time5. This body of research shows how large socio-technical 
systems are made up of technological artefacts such as power stations, solar panels, electricity 
grids etc, alongside the social systems needed to reproduce them such as engineer training, 
administrative institutions, legal frameworks etc. A Multi-Level Perspective on sustainability 
transitions, shows how reproducing socio-technical system leads to ‘regime’ formation6, or 
 
ii By collective we mean as part of renewable energy communities or citizen energy communities which are both 
legally defined in the new EU Directives. 
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dominant ways of making and doing that rely on a stable set of laws, companies and 
technologies.  
In the EU energy system, the dominant regime is large corporate utilities operating within a 
market framework set by successive directives, largely focussed upon privatisation and 
unbundling of hitherto state operated electricity systems. Thus the ‘regime’ includes the 
existing technologies of the system but also the individuals, skill sets, corporate actors, 
policymakers and daily practices tasked with reproducing the system.  
Regimes, however, are subject to constant pressures from small scale innovator ‘niches’ and 
broad social, economic and ecological or ‘landscape’ pressures. Over time these pressures can 
alter the regime in either unmanaged or managed ways (Fig. 1). 
Figure 1: How Landscapes and Niches affect socio-technical Regimes, from Geels (2004) p.9157 
If a sustainability transition is ‘managed’8, niches can be protected or empowered by 
governments and regulators so that they disrupt the regime for policy goals such as 
decarbonisation or delivering social welfare9. One such pressure coming from niche and 
landscape level is the need to decarbonise energy systems to avert ecological collapse. This 
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has led regime actors to create policies to manage the niche of renewable energy technologies. 
This includes making legislative space for renewables to MS energy markets, creating subsidies 
or incentives to allow renewable energy developers to make profit, and levying taxes on 
conventional generation so renewables can compete more effectively on wholesale markets. 
The protection of the technological niche of large-scale renewable energy has been successful 
to the extent that renewables can now be considered part of the technological and institutional 
‘regime’ of the EU electricity system.  
Growing prosumer scale renewables means growing two specific institutional niches: 
‘Renewable Energy Communities’ (RECs) and ‘Citizens Energy Communities’ (CECs). These are 
two types of citizen-led participation in renewable energy generation. To be classed as 
mainstream, they would have to disrupt the regime to a level where they become a larger part 
of a ‘new normal’. They are ‘niche’ actors in part because they are only just becoming 
technologically and economically viable.  
Another reason they are a niche, is that these types of organisation do not adopt the same 
institutional values as the existing regime. The legal definition in the Clean Energy Package for 
RECs and CECs states they must be effectively controlled by shareholders or members, natural 
persons, SMEs or local authorities, including municipalities; and their primary purpose must be 
to provide environmental, economic or social community benefits for its shareholders or 
members or for the local areas where they operate, rather than financial profits2,3. This is critical. 
The Clean Energy Package defines an institutional niche and explicitly states it must operate by 
a different set of governing principles and be based on a different set of values than other 
actors in the energy market. This brings us to the second academic approach we need to fully 
understand the findings of this report, a ‘multi actor perspective’.  
1.2.2 A Multi Actor Perspective 
Energy systems involve numerous stakeholders across multiple levels. These actors hold and 
exercise different forms of power, with incumbent actors in centralised and fossil dominated 
systems still predominant. However, the relationship between different groups of actors and 
the power they exercise is often under conceptualised in discussions of energy transitions – 
including those which are prosumer led. Avelino and Wittmayer10 unpack and structure these 
issues of power and agency by developing a ‘Multi-Actor-Perspective’ (MaP) (Figure 2). 
Building on the Welfare Mix Model11, the MaP identifies four overlapping sectors in society: (1) 
the state (2) the market (3) third sector which mixes state market and community logics, and 
(4) the community. The state, market, and community sectors are divided by three axes in terms 
of their public/private character, the non-profit/profit dimension and the formal/informal 
nature of their organisation; whilst the ‘third sector’ is seen to straddle these boundaries. The 
MaP further outlines how the very notion of ‘actors’ in energy transitions often conflates those 
operating at different levels. Avelino and Wittmayer argue that power dynamics operate both 
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within sectors and between them, Thus, established regime: niche dynamics operate across and 
within public, private and community spheres. 
These different sectors and actors operate with very different values, norms and beliefs. These 
‘value logics’12, correspond to respective understandings of the relationship between 
individuals, organisations and society13. While the ‘market logic’ may emphasise competition 
and treat individuals as ‘consumers’, a ‘state logic’ emphasises public policymaking and views 
individuals as voters. 
Figure 2: A multi-actor-perspective on ‘logics’ of collective action10 
 
  
A ‘community logic’ might instead emphasise localism and involve individuals directly as 
stakeholders14. Published research from the PROSEU consortium shows the top four drivers for 
establishing prosumer business models are ecological and social, with “decentralising 
production” and “creating a sense of community” as strong motivations for establishing 
prosumer initiatives15. At the bottom of the motivations for establishing prosumer communities 
were market-based values like “Improve revenues for your community/organisation” and “take 
advantage of subsidy schemes” (op. cit). Clearly prosumer communities are having to find 
business models that can survive in a market setting while being motivated by different value 
logics.  
Each of these logics may represent alternative approaches to governing an energy transition 
in which prosumers are to play a significant role. The Clean Energy Package enshrines a strong 
market logic by placing consumer choice and rights at the centre of its rationale. This package 
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puts faith in the notion that active individual consumers and suppliers in wholesale and retail 
markets will lead to efficient system outcomes32. It goes on to enshrine institutional principles 
and directives that reflect this logic.  
Throughout the Clean Energy Package there is an acceptance that RECs and CECs are not 
operating on purely market logics; they have governance structures that may lead them to 
ignore or side-line otherwise available revenues. The text of the package recognises this, but 
the tension between the community and market logic is not resolved. The question of how to 
empower the niche of prosumer business models, is left to MS regulators. How this 
empowerment happens depends to a large degree on what business models’ prosumers are 
adopting to act in the energy market.  
1.2.3 Business models and co-evolution 
Whilst the term ‘business model’ has become common in the business community, business 
models are increasingly analysed in academia – they provide a lens to understand 
organisations’ role in economic and social change. Business models ‘describe of the nature of 
value delivered to customers, how organisations and networks create value and the means of 
capturing revenues from that value’16. A business model is not a profit formula or financial 
prediction. It is a blueprint for understanding value creation and value capture. There is an 
increasing body of research which explores how business models may co-evolve alongside 
other elements of socio-technical systems like technologies, institutions, user practices and 
ecosystems17, to deliver social, economic and ecological change.  
Business model co-evolution originates in evolutionary economics and argues that business 
models co-evolve in response to changes to their surrounding ‘ecosystems’18 (Figure 3). For 
energy systems, these changes may be economic, such as cheaper solar panels, or institutional, 
like the Clean Energy Package – creating new selection environments where new business 
models can be explored. Recent work on business model co-evolution has explored how 
energy efficiency retrofit19, energy as a service business models20, and local electricity trading21, 
are all fertile grounds for social, institutional and technological innovation. Therefore, as shown 
by Figure 3, business models do not sit in isolation, but shape, and are in turn shaped by, the 
wider ecosystem within which they are situated. Although we situate the business model at the 
centre of our analysis, we recognise that the wider selection environment promotes or inhibits 
certain business models. 
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Figure 3: The business model at the centre of a co-evolving energy transition22 
 
To understand how new business models might enable social and economic change - such as 
mainstreaming prosumerism - we must also unpack the different elements of a business model. 
Adopting a simple ‘business model canvas’, as developed by Osterwalder and Pigneur23, allows 
us to map the different elements and explore which elements are changing both at the 
corporate utility and collective prosumer level (Table 2). As shown in Table 2, the central 
concept is the ‘value proposition’, which describes the mix of products and services that are 
delivered to the customer and crucially the value that is derived from them. In the energy 
sector, value propositions are a complex mix of electricity system needs and the social and 
environmental goals of prosumer collectives. New prosumer business models are likely to 
involve different value propositions, but may also involve different supply chains, new customer 
interfaces or financial models and new approaches to governance, such as cooperative control.  
Table 2 The elements of a business model 
Element Definition 
Value proposition Value or utility from goods and services  
Supply chain Upstream relationships between an organization and its suppliers  
Customer interface Downstream, customer-related interactions: marketing, sales, aftercare 
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Financial model Combination of an organisation’s capital and operational expenditures with its 
means of revenue generation  
Governance Co-ordination and management and the organisational form: varying levels of 
public, private and civil society governance  
 
In summary, to understand the dynamics of mainstreaming prosumersm, we must both 
understand the types of actors involved and their power relationships, alongside the values 
and ends that different groups ascribe to prosumerism. Then can we understand the 
motivations and outcomes that new business models are seeking to serve, and subsequently 
evaluate their ability to meet these ends. In this context ‘mainstreaming’, the current ‘niche’ of 
collective prosumer business models would need to become dominant and thus enter the 
‘regime’.  
To enter the regime, RECs and CECs will need to find business models that both withstand 
market forces while retaining their core values of community and citizen participation. Finally, 
the business model co-evolution literature shows how a close examination of the flows of 
energy, payments and services that different business models propose, allows us to compare 
the ‘value propositions’ being brought to market by RECs and CECs. Together these approaches 
afford an understanding of what it really means to ‘mainstream’ prosumer communities in the 
European energy market.  
Our next task is to synthesize some of the ongoing developments within the existing energy 
regime and ask: what are the common forces affecting all European prosumers? 
1.3 Five forces shaping European prosumerism 
There are five broad forces in European energy systems that directly affect the ability of citizens 
to become individual or collective prosumers of renewable energy.   
1. Renewable electricity is now cheaper than it has ever been. Subsidy schemes for small 
scale renewables have driven down the cost of renewable energy technology24,25,26. Alongside 
these subsidy schemes for small scale generation, European MS have implemented parallel 
price support for utility scale (i.e. >5MW) projects which, combined with taxing emissions from 
coal and gas generation, has brought large scale renewables close to cost parity with traditional 
fossil power plants27,28. This means that consumers wanting green energy are seeing the carbon 
content of grid electricity reduce in most MS29. This reduces the need to generate one’s own 
zero carbon electricity. At the same time the capital needed for would-be prosumers to 
generate their own electricity is reducing as installations get cheaper, lowering barriers to entry.  
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2. The subsidies, incentives and guaranteed buyers for prosumers are reducing. While 
some utility scale renewables (ground solar, onshore and offshore wind, some biomass) are 
beginning to be economically competitive in wholesale power markets, the cost case for onsite 
generation is less clear. While technology costs have reduced, so have subsidies30. This means 
that prosumer business models that used price guaranteed feed in tariffs (FiT) to make 
prosumerism work financially, have disappeared in many MS31. In other MS the falling costs of 
renewable power make it unclear whether the creation or maintenance of new subsidy schemes 
is the best way to facilitate the growth of the sector. In summary, governments are asking 
whether price support is still necessary, and if not, whether changing market regulation would 
be a more efficient way of growing distributed generation? 
3. Business models which seek to ‘island’ prosumers off from the grid are being regulated 
away. Some of the business models being adopted to deal with falling subsidies were based 
on avoiding paying for the maintenance of electricity grids. In the early days of small-scale 
renewables there was a good argument for prosumers to pay less for the grid because they 
used it less. However the more we understand about how electricity infrastructures earn 
revenue, and the investments they need to accommodate smarter energy systems, the more 
we recognise that a prosumer business models based on completely avoiding grid charges is 
unsustainable31,32. However, business models which allow power to be consumed close to its 
point of generation do help reduce stress on network infrastructure. This is creating problems 
for regulators looking to incentivise local markets, whilst not penalising ordinary consumers.  
4. Small scale players are becoming smarter and flexibility can be rewarded. There are 
ways of pooling prosumers together so their flexibility can significantly benefit the system. The 
smart meter rollout across the European Union is making real progress. This means that the 
consumption behaviour of domestic and small commercial consumers that used to be ‘visible’ 
only as a large ‘block’ can now be accounted for individually. Homes and commercial sites with 
battery storage, electric heating and cooling, vehicle charging, refrigeration, and any number 
of electric loads that can be flexible, are able to capture some value from that flexibility. At the 
same time, allowing these flexible consumers to enter the market is a complex technological 
and regulatory task. It is yet to be seen whether there is enough value in flexibility markets to 
be worth building new business models at the consumer level33 
5. It is becoming increasingly illogical to separate electricity generation from heat 
generation, vehicles and building energy efficiency. We are used to analysing these 
elements of the energy system in isolation, and assuming these discrete elements need discrete 
policy. While experts focus on single areas of domestic and commercial energy policy, citizens 
see a set of energy using practices like making rooms warm and cleaning clothes34. This means 
the next generation of prosumers may buy into new, whole system forms of engagement with 
the energy transition which will need new policy and market regulation. Whole house retrofit, 
‘energy as a service’ and ‘mobility as a service’ business models bundle energy efficiency, 
generation, mobility and flexibility. The PROSEU project has shown prosumer collectives are 
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already developing projects across energy vectors35. If these integrated models grow, it will 
become harder to set policy and regulation only for electricity without considering the heat, 
home appliance, vehicle, and construction sectors.  
Returning to our analytical framework, prosumer business models will co-evolve with these 
‘five forces’ shaping the energy system. These forces disrupt existing utility business models 
and regulatory structures. They force new business models to emerge and empower new 
stakeholders in the energy transition. They create problems for established ways of working 
and new opportunities for collective prosumers. How these pressures empower the niches of 
prosumer business models, Renewable Energy Communities, and Citizens Energy 
Communities, will depend on the value propositions they can bring to their members and the 
wider energy systems, what problems they solve, and for whom.   
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1.4 What problems are new prosumer business models trying to solve? 
1.4.1 Member State Governments 
Problem 1: The need to decarbonise energy systems in line with Paris Agreement  
In the Paris Agreement signed in 2016 governments committed themselves to limit global 
temperature increase to well below 2 °C below compared with the preindustrial levels and 
undertake efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 °C36. The IPCC outlines that CO2e emissions must 
reach net zero by 2050 to reduce the increase of global warming to 1.5 °C37. The European 
Commission has set the EU-wide long-term objective to reduce greenhouse emissions to net 
zero by 2050 in order to limit temperature increase to 1.5 °C38. To meet these greenhouse gas 
reduction targets a complete decarbonisation of the energy system will be crucial39,40. The 
transformation process forces extensive structural changes from centralized fossil-based 
energy sources to centralised and/or decentralised renewables41,42,43. Several studies show that 
a rapid expansion of decentralised renewable energies, such as onshore wind and PV systems, 
as well as the decarbonisation of the transport and heating sector is necessary to fulfil the Paris 
Agreement44,45,46,47. In order to mobilise all climate mitigation potentials, prosumers could play 
an important role in the energy transition process. 
Problem 2: Balancing market creation with social pressures 
It is estimated that more than 50 million people in the European Union are affected by energy 
poverty with a disproportionate impact on women48,49,50. Energy poor households are not able 
to access energy services to an extent necessary to guarantee a decent standard of living and 
health integrity at affordable costs51,52. The reasons for energy poverty range from inefficient 
buildings, to high energy costs and low household incomes. Individuals and households with 
low income are particularly affected53,54. Forms of individual and collective self-consumption 
can target this issue: Insulation programmes combined with prosumer models could help 
mitigate energy poverty55,56. Landlord to tenant electricity models, on the other hand, could 
support lower-income households to gain access to green and cheap electricity57. In addition, 
these approaches link energy poverty alleviation with climate change mitigation58,59.  
Problem 3: Building domestic innovation capacity  
The transition to a decentralized renewable energy system means an extensive change in the 
way energy is generated, distributed and consumed60,61. This requires far-reaching 
transformations of the electricity, heat and transport sector and the need to foster 
technological as well as social innovations62,63,64. The extent to which each socio-technical 
innovation prevails has a decisive influence over the pathway each energy system takes in 
decarbonisation65. Energy communities and prosumers can have a key impact in enabling 
innovations to leave the niche, creating pressure on sociotechnical regimes66,67,68,69. With a 
significant share of prosumers and the resulting greater diversity of actors in the energy system, 
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the capacity for innovation is also likely to increase70. By developing decentralized renewable 
resources, creating participatory energy networks or bringing other sociotechnical grassroots 
innovations on its way, energy communities and prosumers challenge the former fossil-based 
centralized system71,72,73. From this, innovative business models evolve which can contribute to 
the transition of the energy system74,75.  
1.4.2 System Operators 
Problem 4: Keeping the grid stable 
In liberalised electricity markets, wholesale trading meets the majority of supply and demand 
up until ‘gate closure’, when all trades must be settled. Subsequently, System Operators (SO) 
procure a range of ‘flexibility services’ to ensure an equilibrium is achieved and operating 
frequency is maintained. With increasing penetration of intermittent renewables (including 
prosumers), the market for these services is likely to increase76,77. These markets are divided 
into the balancing function/mechanism – addressing the imbalance between wholesale 
position at gate closure and final demand – and ancillary service markets designed to maintain 
system frequency and provide reserve in the event of power station outages78. Historically, 
these services were provided by large thermal power stations and industrial demand 
management. However, prosumers may increasingly provide aggregated flexibility from EVs, 
batteries, heat pumps and other forms of dispatchable distributed generation79,80. This is 
leading to electricity suppliers and aggregators developing sophisticated prosumer flexibility 
business models - enabled by smart and demand responsive technologies and 
appliances81,82,83. However, reliance on these markets is always more expensive than optimised 
wholesale trading84,85. Therefore, supplier and aggregators may in future use prosumer systems 
in wholesale trading, often without prosumers involvement86. Across MS, these developments 
present new challenges for regulators and SOs to ensure these markets are accessible to 
prosumers and aggregators87,88.  
Problem 5: Maintaining the grids 
The profusion of prosumers and decentralised energy systems also presents emerging 
challenges for electricity network operators89,90. Large centralised systems of generation and 
transmission are increasingly complicated by lower voltage distributed generation which grids 
were not originally designed to accommodate91. This potentially leads to increased stress on 
network infrastructure, either in periods of high generation, or during high demand - 
exacerbated by increasing electrification of heat and transport92. To resolve these issues a range 
of solutions are emerging that will increasingly involve prosumers93,94. Examples such as Piclo, 
a software provider and platform operator are working with UK Power Networks to aggregate 
small scale ‘turn up’ and ‘turn down’ signals to reduce network stress, exemplifying DNOs move 
towards DSOs95,96. Other ‘behind the meter’ models are seeking to minimise their use of the 
public networks altogether, combining multiple sites of generation and demand on privately 
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owned networks97,98. These models are introducing new challenges for suppliers and in turn 
regulators recoup network charges in a way that is fair to both prosumers and non-prosumers 
alike99,100.  
Problem 6: Planning for the near future 
Advocates of prosumerism envisage a future where prosumer energy systems and other forms 
of decentralised generation become the dominant means of power production101. However, 
future energy system modelling often depicts these scenarios alongside futures which retain 
much of the centralised character of the current system; involving large amounts of offshore 
wind, CCS and nuclear for example102. Predicting which energy future will become dominant is 
complicated by a multitude of factors including technology development and costs, public 
policies and the geo-political and socio-economic dimensions of an uncertain future103,104.  
Prosumerism represents a future where individual and citizen led action plays a significant role 
in the energy transition105. Emerging trends suggest that this may exploited by existing utilities 
and large technology companies, although community energy groups seek to ensure greater 
citizen and civic control106,107,108. Equally, there are signs that the prevailing ‘market logic’ of the 
last 30 years may be increasingly challenged by greater municipal and state involvement109,110. 
This uncertainty presents a problem for policymakers, regulators, system and network 
operators alike, as they attempt to accommodate the needs of these divergent interests and 
visions of the future. 
Summary 
Each of these problems are important to understand when evaluating current and future 
prosumer business models. Successful prosumer business models are likely to address some 
of these problems for other system stakeholders. Prosumer business models that exacerbate 
some of these problems will meet more barriers and enjoy less longevity. As we explore if and 
how prosumer business models can be mainstreamed, we must keep these problems in mind 
and highlight how each business model develops shared value.   
 
1.5 Electricity markets and prosumers: retail prices, subsidies and system 
charges 
While it is beyond our scope to compare local conditions, there are five elements that remain 
common across EU MS, these are the retail price of electricity, the level of direct subsidy, 
whether there is an export price paid for excess generation, if net metering is used, and whether 
prosumers avoid ‘system’ charges. These are shown in Table 3 for the MS studied.  
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Table 3: An overview of retail prices and support schemes for prosumers in case study Member 
States in 2019 
  
 
iii Eurostat (2018), Electricity prices for household consumers (2 500 kWh < annual consumption < 5 000 kWh, taxes 
included), second semester 2018  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Electricity_price_statistics 
iv In some MS the FiT and export tariff were the same thing, although in the UK you were paid twice, once just for 
generating (even if self-consuming) and again when exporting, although the export tariff was very low. 
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Prosumers for the Energy Union 
PROSEU D4.1– Business Models for Prosumers in Europe   26 / 92 
 
vIEA (2019) https://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/belgium/name-24375-
en.php?s=dHlwZT1yZSZzdGF0dXM9T2s,&return=PG5hdiBpZD0iYnJlYWRjcnVtYiI-PGEgaHJlZj0iLyI-
SG9tZTwvYT4gJnJhcXVvOyA8YSBocmVmPSIvcG9saWNpZXNhbmRtZWFzdXJlcy8iPlBvbGljaWVzIGFuZCBNZWFzdXJ
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The Retail Price: This is the average price consumers pay per unit of electricity. If a consumer, 
e.g. a medium sized office building, installs renewable generation ‘behind’ their meter, that 
meter will only record the difference between what is being generated and what is being taken 
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from the “public” grid. The consumer is then only charged the retail price for the electricity 
from the public grid. So, if an office is using 30 kW constantly for one hour on a sunny day at 
midday, they will have used 30kWh. If they have a solar array of 30kWp and assuming no 
conversion losses they will generate 30kWh during that period and the meter will record 
nothing, they have paid 0.00 Euros for that hour’s electricity. In Germany they would have saved 
0.3 Euros, 30 Eurocents, in Portugal 0.229 Euros. In summary, the higher the retail price of 
energy the better financial case for the prosumer.  
 
This is where the similarity ends however, as depending on the country involved and the tariff 
selected, a commercial company or household could be paying a standing charge for electricity 
which is levied every day no matter their consumption. The retail price is a mix of whatever the 
retailer paid to the wholesale market for the power, the costs of running the physical electricity 
grid called ‘network charges’, the administration and profits of the retailer, and taxes or policy 
costs levied by governments. As shown in Figure 4, the proportion of these charges varies 
substantially across MS: 
 
Figure 4: Composition of household energy prices in 2017 Source 111 pp.3 
 
The same mix of network charges, taxes and energy costs that make up the household retail 
price also make up retail prices for commercial and industrial consumers. Broadly speaking, 
consumers pay many of these charges volumetrically, i.e. per unit of energy used. This means 
the less you use the less you pay. To an electricity meter and to the system as a whole, on site 
generation that is consumed on site, looks the same as if that consumer had made efficiency 
savings.  
 
Increasingly, the highest value electricity to a consumer is that which they consume themselves, 
as subsidies have reduced, it makes more financial sense to self-consume; indeed, in MS with 
high insolationvi and high retail prices, such as Italy and southern Germany, subsidies become 
obsolete between 25-50% self-consumption112. Much of the business model analysis that 
follows can be understood as attempts to treat as much energy as possible as ‘self-
 
vi “Sunnier” countries 
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consumption’ even if the definition of ‘self’ goes beyond a given house or business and 
includes a group of properties, individuals, and multiple meter points.  
 
It is however unlikely that intermittent renewables like wind and solar, will always generate 
electricity when it is needed in the property. We often use our electricity at night when our 
solar is not generating or be away from home during the sunniest of days. A wind turbine on 
an office car park may generate the most energy on a windy weekend when the site is empty. 
When prosumers use more than they generate they pay the retail price for energy, but when 
they generate more than they use, they should be paid for the excess, as some other consumer 
will use it. How they are paid for the excess, drives the payback period and financial 
performance of the investment. There are three elements to this, whether net metering is 
available, whether there is an export tariff, and how any subsidy is paid.  
  
Net metering: where MS allow net-metering, prosumers get compensation for energy 
generated over a long period of time, ranging from one month to several years. With net-
metering, customers can offset their electricity consumption with small-scale RES over an entire 
billing period, using it at a time other than when it is produced, they effectively “store”vii their 
energy in the utility’s grid113 and use it when convenient. Pure net metering would mean a 
consumer who used most of their electricity at night but owned a rooftop solar array could 
behave as though they were consuming their own generation and be billed as such. In this case 
if the prosumer used 100 units a month during the night and generated 100 units a month 
during the day, their bill would be zero.  
 
In practice many net metering schemes have a cap on how much the prosumer can ‘net’ off 
and/or allow the netted supply to be charged back to them at some ratio. This allows utilities 
to recover some of the network charges and taxes that comprise the retail price. This means 
prosumers who make use of the physical grid, pay something for its upkeep. Calculating the 
fairness of this payment and determining whether prosumers are paying the true costs of their 
network use is a critical issue. It is critical because network charges are socialised across all 
consumers, and any of those charges that prosumers avoid, are subsidised by non-prosumers4.  
 
Feed in tariffs: renewable energy subsidies are diverse and the detail of each is unique to each 
MS. In general, they amount to a payment received by the prosumer which is above what they 
could earn selling power on a wholesale marketviii. One model that has become popular is the 
FiT approach, were prosumers are paid a fixed price for energy they actually or notionally 
 
vii They do not ‘store’ electricity, but because of the way the administration works it appears as if they had.  
viii Prosumers are unable to participate directly in wholesale markets and usually rely on their retail supplier to 
purchase excess generation. Whether this generation has any real value to a retail utility, or whether it only 
complicates the trading strategy of the utility depends on the sophistication of that utilities systems and how many 
prosumers they are contracted with.  
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‘export’ or feed into the wider public grid114. We will not dwell on FiTs here because they are 
reducing across most MS. MS who wish to grow a small-scale renewables sector may find FiTs 
and other subsidies a critical tool on the path to establishing domestic capabilities in 
distributed renewable generation115. However, we observed a general downward trend and a 
desire to phase out such subsidy.  
 
Renewable energy subsidies do exist and are growing, but the trend is for them to exist on a 
‘level playing field’ on which large utility scale renewables developers participate in subsidy 
auctions, competing to be the developer who can build the most renewable capacity for the 
least subsidy116. Economies of scale matter, and the simple administrative burden of 
participating in these auctions makes any prosumers winning an auction unlikely.  
 
Export prices: Export prices are different to FiTs when they reflect the actual value of the 
exported power to a licensed utility. A utility will have a power purchase agreement (PPA) with 
the prosumer which will usually be a fixed price per unit. Until recently these PPAs between 
utilities and prosumers were more common where the prosumer was a larger commercial site. 
This is because larger commercial sites had sophisticated metering and sufficient export of 
energy, to make it worthwhile for the utility to include these generators in their wider wholesale 
trading market. For household prosumers the amount of excess power produced was often too 
small to account for, often ‘spilled’ onto the grid, often more of a hindrance than a help to 
those managing the wholesale markets. However as smart meters are rolled out across the EU, 
and electricity billing is digitalized, it becomes more realistic to account for these small units 
of power in real time. This means utilities can offer prosumers a ‘market price’ for the excess 
they produce.  
 
In the United Kingdom the Smart Export Guarantee117 ensures prosumers are paid a price 
above zero for their excess capacity. As the UK does not have net metering, and FiTs have been 
removed for prosumers, this is the only price small scale generators will receive for exported 
power. In a perfectly competitive market prosumers would switch tariffs until they found a tariff 
with the optimal deal for them; the price the utility offered them would reflect the “real” value 
of prosumer ‘spill’. This approach only allows the ‘market value’ of power to be remunerated 
to the prosumer, it does nothing to value the ecological, social or wider economic development 
benefits of these local prosumer investments, nor recognise the weaker negotiating power of 
prosumers vs utilities. 
 
Network charges: Electricity consumers pay for and maintain the network of power lines, sub 
stations and other infrastructures that make up the physical ‘electricity grid’ through their 
energy bill. These ‘network’ costs go to the companies with responsibility for these assets. 
Because all EU citizens have the right to choose their energy retailer, the network companies 
and the retailers are different companies. This means the retailer (the company that sends the 
final bill) needs to redistribute part of that payment directly to network companies. In some 
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situations, like our ‘pure’ net metering example, prosumers avoid paying for networks. If we 
want to understand whether or not different prosumer business models should be 
mainstreamed, network charges are a critical factor.  
 
In the Netherlands for example, net metering customers pay a grid chargeix and in Spain only 
part of the retail bill is eligible for net metering and other fixed costs remain. In the Netherlands 
as in other MS, and as with FiTs, the tendency is for diminishing or time limited net metering 
provisions, the aim being to maximize self-consumption and minimize direct subsidy from 
other user charges or general taxation. It is not always the case that net metering substantially 
undermines fair network charging118, but at the levels of penetration we would class as 
‘mainstreaming’ network charge avoidance would lead to ordinary consumers subsidizing the 
network use of prosumers. 
 
The ‘hidden’ subsidies of network charge avoidance arise when prosumers self-consume 
electricity and reduce their overall demand for ‘grid’ electricity. If the network costs are 
recovered on a volumetric basis, i.e. by how many kWh the meter records, prosumers naturally 
pay fewer network charges as their self-consumption is not recorded. Yet prosumers still 
require the same services of grid infrastructure, even if they use it less intensively. The value of 
the grid for prosumers is that it is there when they need it. The argument is that prosumers 
should pay for that opportunity to use the grid, not for how much of it they use. In countries 
where prosumerism and distributed generation are becoming more prevalent, such as the UK, 
regulators are moving away from a network cost recovery model based on how much metered 
electricity consumers/prosumers use, to a fixed charge based on the average cost of the 
network to all users in particular voltage bands. Prosumers will pay more in electricity bills if 
system regulators across MS choose to eliminate the ‘hidden’ subsidy of volume charging 
prosumers for grid services119,120.  
 
Taxes and freedom from ‘undue’ charges: The final consideration for the prosumer models 
is whether or prosumers avoid energy taxes in the retail price of energy. Perhaps one of the 
most impactful additions of the Recast RED is article 21 is that households who self-consume 
renewable electricity sources without feeding that electricity into the public grid are exempt 
from disproportionate procedures or grid charges that are not cost-reflective2. The case of 
Spain’s “Sun Tax”121 shows how charges for self-consumed electricity can still be made, they 
were justified by paying for the ‘hidden’ subsidy of network charge avoidance. The challenge 
will be striking a balance between a cost reflective and non-cost reflective charging structure 
for self-consumed energy 122.  
 
 
ix http://www.res-legal.eu/search-by-country/netherlands/single/s/res-e/t/promotion/aid/net-metering-
1/lastp/171/ 
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In some nations such as Germany, taxes on the energy bill translate to a large proportion of 
the retail price of energy. Where energy is self-consumed, these taxes can be avoided if they 
are levied volumetrically. However, where electricity uses the public grid, i.e. beyond the meter, 
it will be for states to decide whether different business models seeking to extend self-
consumption are made liable for these taxes or not.  
 
Value for other system stakeholders: The value prosumers bring to the system in the early 
part of a renewables transition is not just in terms of low carbon energy. Building a prosumer 
base helps to build local and national skills and capacity in renewable energy installation and 
maintenance. MS Governments may favour high initial FiTs to increase learning rates and 
reduce costs for eventual utility scale deployment. Whether this pathway is necessary for all 
nations now utility scale renewables are replicable and well understood is questionable. 
Therefore, individual prosumers are unlikely to be the cheapest way of developing a future 
renewable and decarbonized electricity in many of host nations.  
 
Summary: In summary the ability to generate one’s own electricity in the absence of a FiT still 
exists. The Energy Market and Renewable Energy Directives in the Clean Energy Package ensure 
the rights of prosumers are clearly defined. However FiT type subsidies are reducing across 
Europe at the same time that more attention is being paid to the ways in which prosumers 
avoid other socialized costs. Prosumers self-consumed electricity often avoids paying network 
costs and energy taxes. It is up to MS whether these subsidies on self-consumed electricity 
should continue, if they do not, like in the UK with the move to fixed network pricing, the 
reduction in subsidies for prosumers could be even sharper than the simple removal of FiTs.  
 
At the same time, the way exported power is treated is also changing. The roll out of smart 
meters enables prosumers to get a ‘fair’ market rate for the value of their exported energy. In 
wholesale markets however, that fair price is likely to be anywhere between 0.01 Euros and 0.05 
Euros and nowhere near the same value as self-consumption. If we want to see prosumer 
business models enter the mainstream, the easiest option is to find some ‘convergence’ of 
business models across Europe where a single ‘winner’ emerges. Far from converging however, 
the prosumer business case becomes more diverse as individuals must negotiate the landscape 
of taxes avoided, network charges paid or not paid, the export price one can secure, and the 
volume and value of retail priced electricity avoided. This means we have to pay attention to 
the diversity of business models emerging. One element of that diversity is where the definition 
of self-consumption ends. 
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1.6 Research Question 
Our objective is to understand how new business models can mainstream prosumerism, 
moving RECs and CECs out of the ‘niche’ and more or less establishing them within the ‘regime’. 
We need to understand how prosumer business models solve the problems of multiple actors 
and create value propositions in doing so. We need to understand if those value propositions 
can be monetized. We need to understand these business models at a granular level, which 
leads to our research question: 
What prosumer business models are emerging across Europe, how do they work and what 
problems do they solve for multiple actors i.e. prosumers, governments and the energy system? 
2. Methodology 
To explore this research question, we sampled the seven Member States (MS) that host the 
PROSEU consortium; The United Kingdom, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, 
Spain, and Croatia. Where other Proseu work also includes France and Italy the resource 
intensiveness of the business model co-creation method used led us to limit our sample to 
nations where project partners are based. Each MS has different electricity prices, subsidy 
schemes, renewables sectors and energy policies. Each MS has different levels of market and 
state involvement and different actors involved in the energy system. Each MS has interpreted 
and transposed EU Directives differently into system regulation. This means the business 
models being adopted by prosumers will be different in each MS.  
2.1 Methods 
To explore these different business models, we used a business model co-creation method123. 
This method captures the flows of energy, payments, flexibility services, and system balancing 
by creating single component diagrams showing how each business model works. By creating 
multiple business model component diagrams, we see different business model ‘archetypes’ 
emerge. We can then compare how each archetype addresses different problems faced by the 
energy system.  
The methods used to create these component diagrams varied (Table 4). In the UK, we used 
eleven semi-structured interviews to explore emerging business models with their founders or 
with regulators. In Germany and Croatia, we used desk research alongside a small industry 
sample of interviews. In Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium/Flanders, we ran a one-
day business model innovation workshop where participants were drawn from industry, 
academia and NGOs and prosumer groups.  
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Table 4: Methods and Sample 
Country and 
dates 
Sample and method 
Archetype component 
diagrams 
UK: Q4 2018 / Q1 
2019 
Baseline documentary analysis and 9 in-depth 
semi-structured interviews with representatives of 
each business model or regulators. 
7 x archetype diagrams 
developed by project researcher 
Germany: Q1 2019 Baseline documentary analysis and expert opinion 
from PROSEU researchers. 
5 x archetype diagrams 
developed by project researcher 
Spain: Q2 2019 Business model co-production stakeholder 
workshop. 19 participants connected with the 
Spanish energy transition participated. This 
included distribution utilities, renewable energy 
companies, and environmental NGO’s. 
4 x archetype diagrams 
developed by workshop 
participant groups.  
Portugal: Q2 2019 13 participants connected with the Portuguese 
energy transition participated. This included 
academics and postgraduate researchers from the 
Faculty of Sciences at the University of Lisbon and 
representatives from Portuguese distribution 
network operators and prosumer innovators.  
3 x archetype diagrams 
developed by workshop 
participant groups.  
Croatia: Q3 2019 4 x semi structured interviews Croatian Energy 
Regulatory agency, Ministry of Environmental 
Protection and Energy, University of Zagreb – 
Implementation of Advanced Concept for 
Electricity Trading (IMPACT) project, Renewable 
Energy/ Crowdfunding Platform Developer.  
The creation report developed 
insights of drivers of collective 
prosumerism and is appended to 
this report.  
Netherlands: Q2 
2019 
19 participants connected with the Dutch energy 
transition participated. This included researchers, 
policy makers, energy cooperative members and 
local energy companies.  
4 x archetype diagrams 
developed by workshop 
participant groups.  
Belgium: Q3 2019 10 participants connected with the Belgium 
energy transition participated. This mostly 
included energy cooperative members, 
researchers and employees of local energy 
companies. 
2 x archetype diagrams 
developed by workshop 
participant groups 
Totals:  84 stakeholders engaged from across energy 
innovation, utilities, regulators, researchers, 
innovators and financiers in 7 MS.   
25 x archetypes were identified 
or proposed across 7 EU Member 
States 
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Full empirical reports from each of these empirical activities in each MS are included on the 
PROSEU website with the raw diagrams and narrative on each system. In this report a sample 
of these archetypes are used, and the diagrams have been presented in a common format.  
Pilot study: The UK research was undertaken towards the end of 2018 and in early 2019. The 
Authors aimed to explore a case that was likely to have multiple business models relevant to 
this research. The UK is an appropriate case study because the UK’s market has been unbundled 
for longer than most EU nations and, as research by the Council of European Energy Regulators 
identified, several UK prosumer cases are already in trial phase4. We identified seven collective 
prosumer business model archetypes and analysed their relation to the problems faced in the 
UK energy system. These archetypes are presented in the main results section alongside those 
from other MS. However, this analysis also allowed the research team to define 10 ‘key 
principles for prosumerism’. These principles are grouped in the business model canvas 
categories identified in section 1.2.3124, they mirror the concerns of the Council of European 
Energy Regulators4 who also assert RECs and CECs should not pass costs to non-participating 
consumers, that customer data and protection is maintained, and competing market vs 
community and ecological values may distort pure market behaviours and dull responses to 
system price signals.  Our 10 ‘key principles for prosumerism’ are shown in Table 5: 
 
Table 5 The 10 ‘key principles of prosumerism’ 
Value 
proposition 
1. Prosumer business models should deliver bi-directional value propositions that are 
synergistic to both prosumers and the energy system 
2. Greater value can be created and captured through models that deliver services 
across multiple energy vectors 
3. Prosumer business models create non-financial value that is important but difficult 
to measure 
Customer 
interface 
4. Prospective prosumers are likely to value simplicity over control of their energy 
systems. Prosumer business models should emphasise the customer journey in their 
design 
Supply Chain 5. Despite delivering greater decentralisation, prosumer business models still rely on 
the existing energy value chain and therefore must contribute to its upkeep 
Financial 
model 
6. New prosumer business models can improve their revenue streams in four key ways: 
Increase self-consumption behind the meter, achieve improved prices for exported 
power, Flexibility, balancing and ancillary service markets, Shift energy vectors 
7. Prosumer business models need to be effectively remunerated through reduced 
UoS charges, if they create value for distribution and transmission network 
infrastructure 
 
8. Business models solely based on avoiding network charges are likely to be 
unsustainable long term – as they violate 1 and 5 
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9. Business models that involve the provision of flexibility services need access to these 
markets and should be remunerated through payments or reduced charges; 
Governance 10. Community, municipal and market logics are all a feature of the prosumer 
phenomenon – based on a range of competing ‘normativities’ and visions of the 
future, these governance logics should be made explicit. 
 
We use these principles in Section 4 to explore whether the business models proposed in 
section 3, and developed by the international workshops, are likely to reinforce the European 
energy transition or undermine its sustainability. While the PROSEU project has defined 
broader guiding principles for prosumer policy options125, here we are concerned only with 
using the 10 ‘key principles’ above for the business model element of the system.   
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3. Results 
Our results are organized throughout this section by the problems they solve for prosumers, 
as well as other system stakeholders such as MS governments, distribution grid operators, 
regulators and system operators covered in section 1,4. In section 3.1 we explore the elements 
that make up the financial incentives for individual and collective prosumers. We then use these 
categories to understand how different prosumer business models, capture revenues or avoid 
system costs to make themselves viable.  
3.1  Prosumer business models and the problems they solve.  
3.1.1 I just want to generate my own power but I’ve heard subsidies have gone?  
Building an attractive economic case for the installation of on-site renewable generation 
depends on the cost of equipment, installation and maintenance, against the volume of retail 
price electricity saved, and the sum of any subsidy and/or the price paid for exporting excess 
electricity126. When generous subsidies in the form of FiTs exist, and/or various net metering 
schemes are set against high retail prices, the financial case for prosumers can be attractive. 
However, there is no perfect subsidy or financial model that makes prosumerism ‘viable’.   
 
Some households or businesses will be content with longer payback times because they value 
the contribution, they are making to an energy transition, whereas others will want shorter 
payback times. The decision to become an individual prosumer is driven by a mix of financial 
and non-financial value logics15. Business models #1 and #2 presented below show the basic 
flows of value around the system in the UK and Germany for FiT supported prosumers.  
 
Business model #1 represents the basic prosumer model for the UK as it was prior to the 
removal of the FiT subsidy in 2019127. In this model the Prosumer received two payments one 
for export and one subsidy tariff. The prosumer also did not pay full network charges. The 
removal of both the FiT and the ‘embedded benefits’128 accrued from avoiding grid charges, 
has undermined the cost case for the basic prosumer model in the UK.  
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Business Model #1: Basic Prosumer UK [prior to FiT removal] 
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Business Model #2: Basic Prosumer Germany 
 
In Germany, according to the Renewable Energy Sources Act EEG 2017129 (§ 3 No. 19) self-
consumption legally exists, if three criteria are fulfilled: (1) plant operator and electric consumer 
are the same person, (2) immediate spatial proximity between generation and consumption, 
(3) no usage of the public grid. The regulatory framework for self-consumption favours small 
systems under 10 kWp. For that power range, self-consumption is exempt from most electricity 
price components and no EEG levy has to be paid. For larger systems, a reduced EEG levy of 
40 percent on self-consumed electricity must be paid to the grid operator. FiT subsidy still 
exists in Germany, the retail price of electricity is one of the highest in the Eurozone, and some 
avoidance of grid charges is possible. This makes the cost case for the basic prosumer remain 
attractive, though with some tariff degression and potential residential market saturation the 
overall financial viability of UK prosumerism may be falling.  
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The financial part of the calculation for the two business models above, and across Europe, 
differs due to peculiarities of national energy systems and by local conditions such as the prices 
installers charge and the suitability of individual sites. Given the hidden subsidies of network 
revenue loss and tax avoidance from self-consumption, individual prosumption may create 
more problems than it solves for MS governments. Individual prosumers without smarter 
participation in energy services (discussed below) are also likely to have an exacerbating effect 
on uncertain wholesale markets and would not contribute to system balancing. Individual 
prosumers as constituted in business models #1 and #2 are therefore not the cheapest way to 
solve decarbonisation problem of states, the revenue needs of networks, or the energy needs 
of system operators.  
 
Because retail price energy avoided (through self-consumption) is now the highest of value use 
of self-generated energy, one way for prosumers to increase the financial viability of their 
schemes is to extend the definition of ‘self’ consumption geographically, beyond an individual 
meter point. The next problem is then whether or not electricity generated close to a group of 
would be prosumers, can be treated as self-consumption even when it passes beyond the 
metering infrastructure of the generator in question. 
3.1.2 Can we collectively self consume beyond more than one user?   
If the definition of self-consumption can apply to more than one household or a collective of 
households and business, then they will each be able to avoid paying full retail price for 
electricity. Again, where retail prices are high and renewable resources such as wind or sun 
plentiful, prosumerism can make financial sense without subsidy at between 25-50% self-
consumption112. We found four distinct models of achieving this from our research.  
 
Landlord tenant electricity Germany: The first business model we explore that aims to 
achieve an extension of the self-consumption definition is the German Mieterstrom Model. 
Landlord to tenant electricity is defined in the 2017x Renewable Energy Sources Act129 and 
allows small PV-plants up to 100 kW to be placed on multi occupancy buildings and for the 
landlord (or service company operating the panels) to sell that energy to residents without 
paying network fees and other taxes and leviesxi.  
 
In order to retail energy, the landlord, or delegated energy service company, must meter and 
bill residents separately for energy from the building’s system and energy from the public grid. 
 
x There was a similar model before the introduction of the landlord to tenant electricity provision in the 2017 version 
of the EEG. That model was based on a reduction of the EEG surcharge under specific conditions ("green electricity 
privilege"). In 2013, the coalition government decided to discard that privilege. It was also called "Mieterstrom" as 
it had the same target group. 
xi though the consumer still pays for renewables subsidy on the wider German system 
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Landlords then get a subsidy in the form of the tenant electricity surcharge. This subsidy is only 
available if the electricity is supplied and consumed within the building, without using the 
public grid.  This support is lower than the feed-in tariff, but by avoiding other costs like 
network charges and some taxes, the landlord can sell to residents cheaper than the market 
rate but retain a surplus130. The price tenants pay for electricity must be no more than 90% of 
a regional reference price. Tenants can still choose a retail supplier to meet the difference 
between what the building mounted scheme provides and their total demand. Tenants must 
also have a choice to participate – thus the contract for the electricity building supply must not 
be part of the rental agreement.131  
 
In theory Renewable Energy or Citizens Energy Communities could operate these schemes as 
a co-operative of residents or similar. If the residents invest in and own the scheme it would 
be more analogous to ‘collective self-consumption’. Conversely, if a commercial energy service 
company were to own and operate the scheme, residents get little benefit beyond being 
guaranteed the provenance of their renewable power. In the Mieterstrom example, whether 
this is ‘collective prosumption’ depends on ownership and control of the system, and the values 
and governing principles of those owners, as opposed to the technicality that it is energy 
generated on a single building ‘beyond’ the public grid.  
 
There are two versions of how a tenant may become indirect owner of the solar PV installation, 
and thus a "true prosumer": First, a cooperative owns the system and works with a service 
company for electricity supply. The tenant customer becomes a member of the coop. Second, 
the tenant lives in a building owned by a housing cooperative, of which she is a member. 
Usually, the housing coop has to create a subsidiary that operates the system due to tax 
reasons. 
 
Some issues with the Mieterstrom model include the relatively heavy administrative burden of 
establishing a landlord energy company and the marginal profitability of the scheme. Indeed, 
this model has not reached the levels envisaged even where commercial energy service utilities 
are undertaking the landlord’s role132.  
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Business model #3: Simplified ‘Mieterstrom’, or ‘tenant electricity’ Germany 
 
Collective auto consumption Spain: The second Business model that extends self-
consumption is the Spanish collective auto-consumption model. This model can be split into 
two possibilities, one where the self-consumption remains within a single multi occupancy 
building and one where prosumers within 500m of an installation or within one low voltage 
feed can participate. These models were made possible by the recent Royal Decree133 on 
energy which also repealed the aforementioned ‘Sun Tax’. For simplicity we have combined 
Business model #4 into a single diagram but two schemes are represented. 
 
In the first model different parties within the same multi occupancy building (or plot) share 
collectively the power output of a RES installation. The installation is not behind the meter of 
any of the parties, but it is within the premises of the building. There are two types of subjects: 
the producer and the consumer; also, the owner of the plant. The difference between this 
business model and a private micro grid, is that there is no need for a virtual energy company 
which offers special tariffs, and there is no “behind-the-meter” consumption. Each consumer 
can continue to have another energy supplier.  
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The distribution company measures the hourly consumption of each consumer as well as the 
hourly production. This data is shared with the energy supply companies which issue the 
invoices by subtracting the on-building production (and any excess generation) from each 
consumer’s consumption. The allocation of production is defined in a contract between the 
participants which is communicated to the distribution companyxii. In this way network charges 
remain but wholesale energy costs, some taxes and company profits are avoided by the 
prosumers.  
 
In the second model, different consumers are connected to the RE installation through the low 
voltage grid. They have to be either connected under the same transformer station, within 
500m, or within the same cadastral reference (“instalación próxima a través de la red”). In these 
cases, the producer will have to register as a producer of renewable energies and sign a 
contract of representation on the market. Depending on the kW rating of the system, the 
installation could be exempted from certain administrative steps. Excess energy has to be sold 
to the market. 
As with the first model each consumer keeps their own meter, there is no behind-the-meter 
measurement. Again, there is no need for a common supplier; each participant could still have 
their own energy supplier. The allocation of generation would be based on the data provided 
by the distribution company. Again, network costs are avoided, and the prosumer is able to 
access cheaper energy than they otherwise would through retail priced electricity. The system 
owner can benefit from higher prices than they can achieve through a wholesale PPA. 
In both auto-consumption models the key intermediary is the distribution network operator, 
who in Spain retains all meter data and can communicate self-consumed volumes of each 
scheme participant to their utilities. The DNO can act as a single data manager ensuring self-
consumed volumes are accurately distributed between scheme participants whether they be in 
one building or several. In the UK utility retailers are the primary holders of meter data and 
though this data is notionally available, it adds a further level of complexity for distribution 
operators to access it - raising transaction costs for small schemes. In contrast to the German 
Mieterstrom model, the Spanish model avoids the need for a landlord energy service company, 
reducing transaction costs, or at least loading them onto the DNO.  
The data flows are represented as accurately as possible in the Business Model #4 diagram 
because they highlight the value of the distribution network operator being a single data 
manager. In this way the variable parts of the bill can be reduced for the self-consumer, excess 
electricity can still be sold to the market, and fixed network costs can be recovered. This reduces 
the financial incentive in comparison to a pure self-consumption approach where all charges 
 
xii There are still on-going discussions if the allocation can only be done with a fixed coefficient or also with a dynamic 
coefficient which allocates according to the hourly consumption ratio. 
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are avoided for self-consumed energy. However, it offers a route for would be prosumers in 
rented, multi occupancy buildings, along with owners with unsuitable roof space, to participate 
in prosumers business models. In this way it satisfies more of the key principles renewable self-
consumption than individual prosumer models.  
 
Business Model #4: Collective auto consumption Spain 
The postcode rose Netherlands: The third business model that extends some elements of 
self-consumption is the Netherland’s Postcoderoos (post code rose) model. In the Netherlands, 
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business models similar to tenant electricity are being trailed which allow for some degree of 
shared self-consumption in multi occupancy buildings, though they still require the 
establishment of another meter owning utility and therefore come with more transaction and 
administrative costs than the Spanish collective auto consumption model134. For solar 
installations in a given geographic area the only current provision for collective self-
consumption beyond this is the Postcoderoos model.  
In this model anyone living in one post code can invest in a PV system in their own or a 
neighbouring post codexiii. They usually invest in a co-operative ownership model by buying 
parts of individual installations. An energy supplier then matches the consumption of the 
individual to their share of the renewable generation. This proportion of the individual’s energy 
that is generated in the postcoderoos scheme is then eligible for a tax deduction of 
approximately € 0.11 / kWh + VAT (= € 0.133 / kWh) 135 up to 10,000 kWh/year for 15 years. In 
this way all network charges continue to be paid but the element of self-consumption enjoys 
a discount. Further, the co-operative can redistribute the revenues from energy sold to a 
licensed supplier. In practice there are several suppliers who now bundle the installation, 
maintenance and licensed supplier roles such as Energie VanOnsxiv.  
 
Critically for this research, the post code rose tax discount is only available through co-
operative membership. This means this form of collective self-consumption is only open to 
citizens who are part of a governance structure which is ‘more than’ a corporate utility, and 
that has self-governance and co-operative principles at its heart. It is unique in the business 
models presented so far in that it does something collectively with prosumerism that 
individuals and energy utilities alone cannot do.  
 
 
xiii The central post code is where the generation is situated; neighbouring post codes form the rose “petals”.  
xiv https://energie.vanons.org/  
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Business Model #5: The ‘Postcoderoos’ or ‘Post Code Rose’ model, Netherlands 
 
 
Private wire models [UK example]xv: The final model that extends the definition of self-
consumption is the private wire model. Private wire arrangements, often termed ‘micro-grids’, 
have long been a solution to electricity provision in remote areas, where the cost of grid 
connection is prohibitively expensive. Early examples such as the island of Eigg off the west 
coast of Scotlandxvi, originally used diesel generators, although have recently converted to 
small-scale hydro, wind and PV. In these models, a local private network operator owns the 
low-voltage distribution network rather than the statutory DNO. These entities may also form 
a virtual energy company (VEC), responsible for billing customers for the energy they consume 
 
xv Summarised from authors PROSEU project work reported in: Brown, D., Hall, S. and Davis, M.E., 2019. Prosumers 
in the post subsidy era: an exploration of new prosumer business models in the UK. Energy Policy, 135, p.110984. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.110984  
xvi http://isleofeigg.org/eigg-electric/ 
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within the private network. These models are now also being trialled in grid connected areas, 
with the aim of creating a viable business model for prosumers136.  
 
These prosumer facing models promote consumption ‘behind the meter’, by shifting the Meter 
Point Administration Number (MPAN) to the perimeter of the site. The aim is to share any 
distributed generation between prosumers in the private network area. The VEC can offer an 
improved export tariff and a lower import tariff, based on a privately-owned metering 
infrastructure. The VEC can also incentivise optimal consumption behaviour through time-of-
use (TOU) tariffs during high generation periods. In the UK, provided the VEC is managing a 
system of <2.5MW it qualifies as a license exempt supplier and does not have to abide by the 
balancing and settlement codes137. The VEC may then negotiate an improved supply tariff with 
a licensed supply who takes on the responsibility for balancing and settlement. Under current 
market arrangements, the VEC can also reduce UoS costs as the private wire network is making 
reduced use of the transmission and distribution network. 
 
However, as new network charging arrangements are explored there is a risk that private wire 
networks will see these savings reduce over time. There is also a disconnect between how 
private wire networks pay for fixed network costs, and the balancing services private wire 
suppliers can access due to expanding flexibility markets. For example, in Gateshead, UK the 
municipal council has set up an energy company to run an energy centre providing heat to 
local commercial buildings and households. The electricity produced by the combined heat 
and power plant is used ‘behind’ the meter of a private wire network, with excess sold to a 
licensed supplier. At the same time the flexibility of the gas fired CHP units, means the licensed 
supplier ‘Flextricity’ can help the System Operator balance the system and get paid to do so138. 
Here one benefit to the system is increased by having more competition for ancillary services 
(lowering system balancing costs overall). However, the same model reduces the network cost 
recovery for the DNO.  
 
In the Portuguese workshop, a microgrid solution was also proposed and explored using the 
archetype generation method. Fewer market connected microgrids currently exist in Portugal. 
Island systems are growing139, but the workshop developed a model with similar goals to the 
Gateshead example, albeit with an anchor role for solar PV with battery storage as opposed to 
management of a heat led gas CHP. This shows how the potential for and market design of 
microgrid business models will be climatically driven as well as being influenced by the 
institutional conditions of MS energy markets. The UK and Portuguese micro grid business 
models are shown in business model diagrams #6 and #7 below.  
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Business Model #6: Private wire or ‘microgrid’, UK example 
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Business Model #7: PV and storage microgrid, Portugalxvii  
 
Summary: The ways in which self-consumption are being extended beyond individual 
prosumers differ across the MS investigated.  
 
xvii Due to time constraints this model was not fully developed by workshop participants but it points to a clear 
appetite for experimentation with market connected microgrids even where institutional arrangements are still 
developing.   
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In Germany one way to extend ‘self’ consumption is by participating in a tenant electricity 
model that benefits from a small amount of tax relief, avoids network charges, and creates a 
new subsidy for the scheme owner. The scheme owner can be a landlord, or the landlord can 
delegate to a corporate utility. There is no specific ‘protection’ for the types of non-profit 
Renewable Energy Communities or Citizen Energy Communities that provide environmental, 
economic or social community benefits for their shareholders or members or for the local areas 
where they operate.  
 
In Spain the collective auto-consumption model allows the definition of self-consumption to 
be extended beyond individual dwellings to multi occupancy buildings and/or to schemes 
within a 500m radius or on a given low voltage feeder. The orchestration of meter data held 
by the DNO and not by disparate retail suppliers is critical for efficient allocation of self-
consumption between scheme participants. Participants still pay network charges but avoid 
wholesale elements of the retail price, some utility profits and volumetrically applied taxes are 
avoided by prosumers. There is no specific need for the operating legal entities to be non-
profit led, however some collective governance arrangement is clearly required to establish 
each scheme and it remains to be seen which organisational form the majority of schemes take.  
 
In the Netherlands the post code rose scheme gives a tax advantage to participants while still 
contributing to network costs. This model explicitly requires co-operative governance and is 
the only one of the four business models presented in this section to specifically operate on a 
community or ‘non-market’ governance logic.  
 
The private wire model explored in reference to the United Kingdom is possible to different 
degrees in different nations but there the specific derogation for a supplier license under 
2.5MW of supply has allowed diverse models to emerge. Some fixed network charges have 
been avoided in the past, it remains to be seen if capacity based as opposed to volume based 
charges will eliminate the business case for such micro grid developments and whether other 
‘stacked’ revenues like flexibility can make up for this gap. While the Gateshead scheme cited 
is municipally led, there are no barriers to commercial utilities establishing such a model.  
 
The answer to the question ‘Can we collectively self-consume beyond more than one user’ is a 
qualified ‘yes’ in the cases studied. While the Clean Energy Package defines, in the REDII 
Directive, the right of Renewable Energy Communities to ‘share’ the energy produced by the 
renewable assets they own, and for DNOs to facilitate these transfers. The realities of making 
sure residual supply is met, mean that a licensed utility is often needed to manage the 
allocation of self-consumption between parties so the revenues and costs can be apportioned 
fairly. In none of the examples investigated do any groups ‘share’ energy in the sense that 
excess electricity is given without exchange, or that the demand for energy is managed beyond 
a price incentive by any sort of commons-based management principles140. The architecture of 
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all of the models above aim to apportion exactly the benefits of whichever part of the retail 
energy price is avoided by self-consumption.  
 
In some cases, such as in the Spanish collective auto-consumption model, the apportionment 
of self-consumption is done by the DNO using best available meter data. In others it is the 
responsibility of the supplier. This adds transaction costs as institutions need building to 
administer and account for these flows. Recently the digitisation of metering infrastructure and 
the rise of peer to peer platforms in markets such as ride and accommodation “sharing” have 
called into question the traditional role of these intermediaries. Leading to the following 
question. 
3.1.3 I want to trade energy locally, do I have to buy from a corporate utility?  
Closely aligned with both the issues of extending the definition of self-consumption beyond 
an individual meter point, and trading prosumer energy between neighbours is the notion of 
maximizing the amount of local energy utilized before it either ‘spills’ onto the grid or is 
purchased by a utility by an export tariff. Local tariffs are created by local energy companies 
which are often small enough to operate under the 2.5MW derogations in the UK. They aim to 
retain energy generated within a local area; unlike private wire networks they utilise the DNO 
owned distribution network ‘in front’ of the meter. This is sometimes called a ‘virtual’ private 
wire network. Below, Business Models #8 and #9 show an existing trialled model in the UK and 
a similar proposed model for Portugal. These models link local generation with demand and 
provide prosumers/customers with improved export and import prices. These models typically 
involve either a license exempt local energy company (LEC) offering a local tariff, with balancing 
and settlement occurring through a fully licensed supplier.  
 
In UK examples the LEC offers consumers a time of use tariff. This does not have to be set up 
to maximise local generation. The price signals in a time of use tariff can be based on more 
dynamic price signals derived from smart meter data and signals from both the wholesale 
market and network providers. Examples such as the Energy Local trial in North Walesxviii also 
incentivise lower use of system charges by entering customers into half-hourly (HH) 
settlement– shifting demand away from the daily Red, Amber and Green Distribution Use of 
System charging periods (DUoS) and the three annual TRIAD periods of peak Transmission 
Network Use of System charges (TNUoS).  
 
This has been achieved not only with price signalling but with close community engagement 
to explain how the system works. It is at one remove from a purely price-based system as it 
relies on collective participation and close member engagement. Speculatively, it may be these 
forms of closely engaged communities with a trusted intermediary that may wish to take 
 
xviii http://www.energylocal.co.uk/cyd-ynni/ 
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advantage of the enhanced rights allowed as Citizens Energy Communities in the clean energy 
package as they already have a relevant understanding of network protection needs.  
 
In the Portuguese example, Business Model #9, a similar business model is envisaged with two 
suppliers, one managing the local tariff and close consumer relations and another managing 
the relation to the wholesale market for shortfalls in collective self-consumption. Similarly, the 
local energy company has the opportunity to enter into contracts for balancing with the System 
Operator. While it is a requirement of the Clean Energy Package that barriers to participation 
in these types of balancing market are removed as much as possible, recent work141 has shown 
that only Great Britain, Ireland, France, and Belgium have built up markets for demand side 
flexibility, that is the opportunity earn revenue from demand flexing.  
 
Business Model #8: Local Energy Company UK  
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Business Model #9: Local Energy Company Portugal 
 
Peer to Peer tradingxix: P2P business models are predicated on removing the licensed supplier 
as an intermediary in the trading of distributed electricity generation. These models are based 
on the use of third-party digital platforms where prosumers can securely trade energy with 
 
xix Summarised from authors PROSEU project work reported in: Brown, D., Hall, S. and Davis, M.E., 2019. Prosumers 
in the post subsidy era: an exploration of new prosumer business models in the UK. Energy Policy, 135, p.110984. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.110984 
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each other with minimal involvement from suppliers142. In principle, prices can be negotiated 
directly with other prosumers, allowing them to select the provenance of their electricity. The 
promise of these models is that they allow prosumers to negotiate fairer prices for their 
generation rather than being forced to accept whatever price a supplier is prepared to offer. 
Moreover, models adopting dynamic TOU pricing incentivise prosumers to produce and 
consume energy at times when local generation is high. 
In the USA, the most high-profile example of this is the Brooklyn Microgrid trialxx. Here 
prosumers and collective prosumers (those without direct generation but who are signed up) 
can participate in an online marketplace for energy ‘behind’ a virtual meter. In this geographic 
footprint ‘virtual’ trades can take place. In this way prosumers and collective prosumers can 
trade energy. Price depending, they can maximize the local use of energy, using the platform 
to see when the best time to consume local energy will be.  
Peer to Peer trials are emerging all over Europe. In Croatia the IMPACT projectxxi is exploring 
P2P trading to optimize an island microgrid on the island of Krk143. As testing of the trading 
platform occurs in a lab setting more is being learned not only about how to make the 
microgrid and P2P platform work in an island setting, but also about how ready the remainder 
of the Croatian market is for this scale of actor (see empirical reports at proseu.eu).  
In Germany, the company ‘Enyway’ is building utility scale solar, but instead of trading directly 
to wholesale markets, Enyway is seeking to use an ‘off the shelf’ distributed ledger technology 
developed by Ponton GmbH to divide individual solar modules from the large installation 
between individual customers transparently and securely. Enyway then acts as the retail 
supplier for any shortfall between the collective prosumer and the energy generated from their 
part of the wider array144.  
In the United Kingdom a partnership between the Community Benefit Society Repowering 
London, the licensed retail supplier British Gas, and the technology provider Verv, is using a 
P2P platform to trade the solar generation on the roof of a multi occupancy block. Prior to the 
trial the solar generation could only be used for communal areas and services, the remainder 
receiving an export price and FiT. Within the trial residents can buy the solar directly. Verv acts 
as an exempt supplier and British Gas will provide a bill split between energy self-consumed 
and that which was bought from the market. The regulatory exemptions for this are around 
voluntarily giving up the FiT for the trial period, ensuring customers are not exposed to risk 
and suspension of billing accuracy 
 to account for new technology in the trial145.  
 
 
xx https://www.brooklyn.energy/  
xxi www.impact.fer.hr  
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A recent review of P2P energy146 found the majority of trials are focusing on the use of 
distributed ledgers to similarly link distributed renewable generation with would be prosumers 
without having to use market intermediaries like DNOs or licensed suppliers to handle data 
needs. P2P platforms may be able to reduce administrative costs and drive optimization of 
localized renewables by signalling when the best time is to increase or decrease one’s own 
demand. They reduce but do not yet eliminate the need for a licensed supplier to act as a 
buffer between individual prosumers and wholesale markets.  
 
It is also important to note P2P platforms are only platforms, they do note ‘create’ value in the 
system. The collective prosumer groups that might want to use them will use them to secure 
other values like increased self-consumption, reduced carbon content of electricity, reduced 
taxation, reduced network costs, reduced supplier costs etc. We use the UK as an example for 
a business model diagram where the P2P technology organises household prosumers around 
a decentralised trading platform. It would be equally possible to organise the diagram around 
a multi occupancy block or a distant utility scale renewable installation with individualized 
shared of that generation.  
 
P2P technology can be used by corporate as well as community or state actors in the energy 
transition. Barriers to entry are not as high as might be thought for collective prosumers in 
Renewable Energy Communities or Citizens Energy Communities, as ‘off the shelf’ platforms 
can be purchased for 500 Euro per month. Any collective prosumers using the platform will still 
have to navigate the individual regulatory requirements in each MS to find the value 
proposition just as business models #1-#7 have done.   
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Business Model #10: Peer to peer, UK example  
 
The question that faces peer to peer models is whether or not they are the most efficient way 
of prosumers fulfilling their needs. As we show below there are existing market models that do 
not require engagement with a software platform that can still be used to understand the 
source of ones electricity beyond the broad wholesale ‘pool’.  
 
3.1.4 Can we buy utility scale renewable generation as a group? 
Even without P2P models and distributed ledger technologies there are opportunities for 
consumers to emulate prosumption by buying directly from individual generation sites. Where 
co-operatives or other local energy groups buy shares in medium scale renewable energy 
installations, i.e. larger than building mounted, they will often sell direct to market via a PPA 
with a utility. That utility can then allocate the certificates of origin that come with the 
generation to the consumption of the co-operative members on a dedicated tariff. In most 
Member States there are no regulatory barriers to this form of dedicated tariff. The prevalence 
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of these tariffs will be determined by how active the co-operative or community energy sector 
is in that Member State.  
These models however stretch the definition of a collective prosumer, since there is little that 
can be classed as ‘self’ consumption and the market remains largely unchanged. In some MS 
these models may avoid transmission charges if they are in a single low voltage distribution 
network but given our key principles above, and the direction of travel for network charging 
this saving may not persist. We have generalised the business model diagram accordingly to 
apply to most MS.  
 
Business model #11: Regional electricity tariffs 
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The ability of Local Energy Companies to enter into demand side markets, which we have rolled 
into single component arrows entitled either ‘balancing’ or ‘ancillary/flexibility services’xxii is 
being trialled. It may be that close communication with participants in a community model is 
necessary to ensure more buy in than a price only incentive can achieve. The next set of 
collective prosumer business models are explicitly geared towards capturing flexibility 
revenues.  
3.1.5  Can we use flexible assets to earn some money from the system? 
The need to balance the electricity system from moment to moment, plan for a more 
intermittent future, and protect the physical networks, means that in most MS there is an 
opportunity for collective prosumers to solve problems for other stakeholders and get paid for 
doing so. This is the first time in the exploration of prosumer business models that the focus 
shifts from re-arranging elements of the retail price to earning new value that has hitherto 
been unavailable at the prosumer/consumer and of the energy value chain. For those 
unfamiliar with ‘ancillary services’ or ‘flexibility markets’ their operation can seem opaque. 
Essentially however the revenues that can be earned from them fall into five broad categories.  
 
• The first is basic ‘arbitrage’ which means storing energy during cheap price periods 
then releasing it during higher price periods. This can be done with pumped storage 
hydroelectricity as well as with large grid connected batteries, multiple small batteries 
or electric vehicles in different places but managed as one asset.  
 
• The second is trading flexibility, here before the trading market closes (gate closure) 
and the system operator takes over (usually around half an hour before the time energy 
is to be used), the utilities can fine tune their position, if they are ‘long’ and have bought 
more power than they think their consumers will need, they may ask flexible consumers 
to turn up demand. If they are ‘short’ and think the customers will use more power than 
they have bought in the market, they can ask flexible consumers to reduce demand.  
 
In this way they avoid the system operator having to manage trading mistakes for them 
and charge them heavily for doing so. They then pass some of these savings on to the 
prosumers and prosumer communities with flexible assets like batteries, electric 
vehicles or smart appliances. In Portugal, EDP’s ‘Activation and marketing of end user 
flexibility’ project accomplishes this by dispatching customers flexible load and 
reducing imbalance charges from the system operator 147. In MS where market design 
does not yet allow the participation of aggregators in of peer to peer energy other 
balancing mechanisms and ancillary services markets (below), these flexibility services 
 
xxii We would usually make a single term for these flexibility revenues or services but instead we used the terminology most 
recognisable to workshop participants who were gracious enough to the authors to undertake this work largely in English.  
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that supplier use to fine tune their own position before gate closure can still be trailed. 
EDP Spain is trailing a similar aggregation of commercial office and agro-industrial 
consumers to reduce imbalance exposure (op. cit). 
 
• The third set of services flexible consumers can offer are to ‘balancing services’148. 
Typically, balancing services are traded by larger generators registered in the wholesale 
market. They offer services to the system operator after gate closure to ‘balance’ the 
difference between the sum of what retailers have bought from generators and what 
the actual demand on the system is, these power volumes can be quite large and usually 
need to be sustained for more than a minute.  
 
• For smaller system fluctuations the ancillary services market fine tunes the system. 
Ancillary services such as frequency response are needed within seconds, this can be 
achieved through turning flexible demand up and down, either from a few large players 
or by many small players, which is where prosumers come in. The system operator pays 
the providers of these services.  
 
• The fifth value that can be derived from flexibility is longer term in ‘capacity markets’ 
here, the system operator buys the option to use some capacity at a point in the future 
where there is a risk of an overall system short fall. These capacity mechanisms are 
emerging across Europe149 and have different structures and payment methods. A 
common direction of travel is to allow demand side response to enter these markets150. 
Instead of contracting an ageing power station to stay open longer, large chunks of 
aggregated flexible demand can be used to reduce pressure on the system as long as 
the entity aggregating that demand can guarantee its availability during the contracted 
period.  
 
• The final value that can be derived from flexibility is for network management at the 
low voltage level. In the UK Piclo have explored how a market can be created to allow 
actors with flexible loads to solve constraint problems on local networksxxiii. These actors 
can then be paid a proportion of the savings the network operator makes by not having 
to invest in traditional network reinforcement.  
 
The Clean Energy Package and particularly the Energy Markets Directive3 clearly seek to drive 
demand side participation in these markets and envisage this will be done through dedicated 
electricity tariffs and/or by third party ‘aggregators’. In the CEP both Renewable Energy 
Communities and Citizens Energy Communities have the right to participate in these flexibility 
markets through aggregators or in a non-discriminatory manner2,3. This, along with similar 
 
xxiii https://picloflex.com/dashboard  
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rights for individual consumers, means that regulators in MS need to find new ways of allowing 
‘demand side’ activity to compete on a level playing field with traditional energy utilities.  
 
The ‘aggregator’ signs up multiple small loads into large enough bundles so they can 
participate in the markets for these different revenue streams. In the UK OVO energy and their 
flexibility arm Kaluza have been involved in trials in the Orkney Islands where excess generation 
from onshore wind farms is diverted into domestic heat storage rather than being curtailed151. 
OVO/Kaluza and other providers such as Smartklub hope these trails will provide a test bed for 
a more comprehensive domestic flexibility platform where assets such as PV, heat pumps, 
battery and heat storage and EVs are controlled remotely as a ‘virtual power plant’ with minimal 
behavioural involvement from prosumers151.  
 
 
Business Model #12: Prosumer Aggregator UK 
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Business Model #13: Prosumer Aggregator Spain 
 
The ability of collective prosumers to earn revenues from flexibility provision is driven by the 
extent to which energy markets in host nations are accessible for aggregators141. In Spain and 
Portugal both workshops focused on the potential of aggregators to establish these 
relationships in the future.  
Business Model #13 is one example of this, but across the workshops the participants explored 
how aggregators could aid prosumer business models by bringing a new revenue into the 
financial calculus of collective prosumption. The activities of EPD in both Portugal and Spain 
show utilities are developing offers, however the market has not yet trailed this form of 
participation for collective prosumers. In Business Model #12 from the UK, the separation 
between aggregator and licensed supplier is small. This reflects the Kaluza business model 
where retail tariffs of a parent utility can support and complement the activities of the 
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aggregator. Here the benefits of flexibility to a utilities portfolio in the pre gate closure trading 
period can be optimized against revenues from the system operator, distribution network 
operator, and any future capacity markets. Trails are also ongoing in Cornwall, UK with 
aggregated demand response; where a mix of the revenues identified above are being bundled 
into a single platform that aggregators can bid into152.  
The implications of aggregators for Renewable Energy Communities and Citizen Energy 
Communities are yet to be seen. Aggregators react to strong commercial drivers which may 
override other values held by collective prosumers operating a different value logic as shown 
by Figure 2 in the ‘multi-actor perspective’. One recent study showed aggregator profitability 
increased for managing a communities distributed generation when price only signals were 
followed, and greenhouse gas reduction targets were subordinated153.  
The complexity of operating aggregator business models and the size of market they access 
may preclude community decision making structures as a successful governance model. This 
means commercial companies are most likely to offer to partner with RECs and CECs to share 
the benefits of flexibility. Equally it may be the case that revenues from aggregation are 
sufficient to bypass REC and CEC business models completely and operate a more 
individualistic aggregator to household relationship.  
Aggregation in and of itself does not ensure a viable prosumer business model nor does it 
ensure cost reflective network charges, or that system taxes etc are fairly paid. It does offer a 
way of solving some of the problems of other actors in the energy system; this is why it 
represents one of the few ‘new’ revenue streams to prosumers and prosumer communities can 
access that is not a direct or indirect subsidy.  
A strong theme in the UK pilot study was that aggregation relies on some level of control being 
automated. Time of use tariffs cannot be relied on because consumers can choose not to react 
to price incentives. If a system is automated and the consumer knowingly signs that automation 
of flexibility to the aggregator, then both parties can enjoy more certainty. While some 
aggregators are experimenting with heating and cooling for demand sinks, the aggregator 
business model does not automatically address the decarbonisation of heating along with 
electricity. The next business model we explore does cross these energy vectors.  
3.1.6 Can I bundle all my energy services into one package and pay back with 
savings?  
Until now most of the prosumer business models explored are predominantly about electricity. 
However, across Northern Europe, heat demand is a greater problem for MS governments in 
their decarbonisation efforts. There is an urgent need to retrofit substantial energy efficiency 
measures to the Northern European housing stock154. There are multiple business models for 
housing energy efficiency retrofit155 and those for retrofit only are useful for decarbonisation 
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targets but do not help us here. Where domestic (and small commercial) retrofit does intersect 
with our research question, is when it is undertaken alongside the installation of 
microgeneration, heat pumps/heat networks, and smart meters/ smart appliances. The most 
prevalent model for this type of ’deep retrofit’ is the Energy Service Company or ESCO business 
model.  
Energy service business models guarantee consumers/prosumers receive the final energy 
service such as: reliable electricity, hot water, and stable room temperatures, rather than selling 
a specific technology or energy commodity (units of electricity, gas, oil etc). These models shift 
the responsibility for the performance of the building into long-term contracts between the 
ESCO and the household/business156. Solar-as-a-service models help people become 
prosumers without the upfront cost, as the ESCO owns the panels and takes responsibility for 
finance, installation and maintenance as well as a solar tariff and dealing with the export 
agreements157. Heat-as-a-service models sign consumers to a comfort agreement and can 
operate with district heat network with gas or biomass CHP or by installing heat pumps, again 
with ESCOs owning the infrastructure158,159. These models may even offer energy performance 
contracts for specified comfort, such as levels of internal temperature, further incentivising 
efficiency in building fabric, lighting and appliances.  
Although basic energy service models for district heat provision are common for large public 
sector or commercial sites160, more comprehensive ‘deep retrofit’ models are growing in the 
UK, France and Netherlands. The Energiesprong initiative is a deep retrofit program where 
homes are given a ‘net zero’ makeover which includes a new exterior shell, microgeneration, 
new heating and heating controls. Over a 30-year contract the ESCO guarantees the 
performance of the building, energy bills stay constant, but the householder has an improved 
exterior appearance and internal building health.  
Savings on the energy bill pay back a large proportion of the investment over 30 years.  This 
model has been successful in the Netherlands where costs per home have reduced by focusing 
on uniform social housing and working with local governments and other housing providers. 
The standout benefit from a prosumers perspective is the ESCO or a delegated licensed utility 
can play the role of optimizer or aggregator of heat sinks, batteries and microgeneration 
control, without the need to engage closely in the energy market or respond directly to price 
signals.  
In the UK, SmartKlub are trailing a similar model in the Trent Basin new-build housing project. 
The project features a large PV array, 2.1MW battery, rooftop solar and ground source heat 
pump connected to a district heat network. Smartklub have created an ESCO which is designed 
to manage the system and ensure optimal delivery of energy services with limited involvement 
from the prosumers/residents31. Residents receive a reliable power and heat supply with the 
ESCO optimising the system to secure the best revenues and balance between import and 
export. Unlike Energiesprong, Smartklub do not offer comfort guarantees. However, using their 
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large battery they are contracting into flexibility markets through an aggregator for additional 
revenues. Profits from the ESCO are recycled into a community fund, whilst the ESCO itself 
passes into community ownership at the end of the trial phase (op cit.) 
The consumer’s right to switch supplier is strengthened in the Clean Energy Package, and 
switching times are to reduce to as little as 24 hours. This means financing deep retrofit directly 
through ‘on the bill’ savings where the ESCO is also the retail supplier is difficult. Instead tenants 
can still switch supplier, it is only that they are switching with a much-reduced energy demand. 
The remainder can be paid on an energy service charge particularly when the householder is a 
tenant of a larger housing provider and the Heat Plan can be part of the wider service charges 
on the property.  
Below we show the UK example because this was the most developed by the primary research 
undertaken. However, it should be noted that wherever retail energy prices are high, and there 
are cold, difficult to heat homes, an ESCO model could well be viable. The Energiesprong model 
is only one approach with a particularly ‘deep’ approach to retrofit and other models may 
become even more viable by focusing on cost optimal measures.  
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Business Model #14: Energy Service Company UK  
Energy service models currently being trialled may also experiment with parts of the other 
business models explored here, for example, post retrofit a household could also benefit from 
a postcoderoos model, a collective auto consumption model, or a local energy company with 
time of use tariff. How the households or small businesses in a scheme interact with each other 
is not fixed, and as such they may find new ways of further optimising the locally generated 
energy. ESCOs enable cross vector decarbonisation of electricity and heat. The final vector of 
energy consumption which remains unexplored is transport.  
3.1.7 Can I link transport into prosumerism? 
In the REDII on common rules for the electricity market, Citizens Energy Communities may offer 
energy services such as charging electric vehicles. The addition of electric vehicle charging to 
any business model that also extends the definition of ‘self-consumption’ is important. It offers 
a new set of options for storage, particularly for those business models which practice collective 
self-consumption such as the Mieterstrom, Postcoderoos, and Collective Auto-consumption. 
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Could multi occupancy buildings use electric charging stations as part of the ‘self-consumed’ 
electricity? Could car sharing and car clubs become involved in such activities? If so an EV 
charge station may substantially increase self-consumption by adding an intermittently 
available battery to the assets of a citizen’s energy community.  
Recent work has explored how energy business models and smart charging can be linked with 
other urban infrastructures161. The needs of city governments, the auto industry and energy 
utilities align in that there are air quality benefits of electrification for cities, climate compatible 
modes of automobility for manufacturers to support, and a new energy vector for electricity 
utilities to service. The emergence of transport electrification across private cars, commercial 
fleets and public transport mean the opportunities to link local generation with diverse local 
storage are growing. The rise of ride sharing and mobility as a service offers - where owning a 
private vehicle is supplanted by mixed public transport and vehicle sharing162 - mean that 
Citizen Energy Communities that offer charging services may have an expanded set of options 
in how to offer those services. Prosumer communities may be able to sell power directly to 
reliable loads like public transport providers, enrolling another actor and another energy vector 
in the collective prosumption model. 
These business models are currently speculative however, outside some isolated examples such 
as Big Lemon Bus Company in Brighton UK, where part of the electricity demand of their e-bus 
fleet is met by solar PV installed on their own depotxxiv. Similarly, bus to grid services are being 
trialled in the UK in a project with London’s bus fleet, where ‘vehicle to grid’ capable busses 
are being provided to Go Ahead London and an aggregation platform will be used to allow 
them to participate in flexibility markets. While collective prosumption business models #3-14 
above are still emerging, it will remain important to track the role and possibilities of transport 
electrification for supporting their growth. In Business Model #15 below we present the Big 
Lemon example as if it were V2G equipped.  
 
xxiv https://thebiglemon.com/ 
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Business Model #15: E-Mobility service provider 
3.1.8 Summary 
This section has presented 15 of the 25 the business model archetype diagrams developed by 
the researchers over a ten-month, mixed method, seven country research effort during 2018 
and 2019. The business models presented are those which: A) most clearly developed by 
workshop participants and B) most closely addressed specific problems or questions facing 
prosumers and collective prosumers. In the supporting materials for this report on the PROSEU 
website https://proseu.eu/, we publish the in country empirical reports and all of the business 
model archetype diagrams.  
Most of these business models are at some stage of market entry, be they in trial phase, or 
early market operation. Some are more speculative such as local energy companies in Portugal 
(Business Model #9) and prosumer aggregation in Spain (Business Model #13). Some business 
models are already, to a degree, mainstreamed; these are Business Models #1 & 2 Individual 
prosumers in the UK and Germany and Business Model #11 regional energy tariffs in Germany. 
However, the individual prosumer business model, and its financial attractiveness, is rather a 
hostage to fluctuating FiT subsidies that are reducing throughout Europe. Increasingly reverse 
auction subsidies for utility scale renewables suit nation states as the most cost-effective way 
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of decarbonizing the overall carbon intensity of grid electricity. As subsidies reduce, self-
consumption becomes the most valuable thing to do with on-site generated energy. Where 
the retail price is higher and the local resource plentiful, becoming a prosumer can have an 
attractive payback period without subsidy at 25-50% self-consumption.  
Extending the definition of self-consumption beyond a single meter point is the focus of 
business models #3, #4, #5, #6, and #7. . They all achieve this in different ways, and they all 
allow prosumer communities to avoid different proportions and elements of the retail price. 
While they increase the overall level of ‘self’ consumption, they also become liable for some 
network charges, taxes etc. They do nothing to actively shift demand to periods of high local 
production using ‘smart’ tariffs or automation, however this will be incentivized naturally by 
the savings prosumers make on retail price avoidance. 
Local Energy Companies, Business Models #8 and #9, seek to use dynamic price incentives to 
maximize local self-consumption and/or reduce grid charges. The members of the prosumer 
community can decide which preferences the tariffs should reflect. The model is available in 
the UK under the supplier derogation of 2.5MW of supply and is therefore viable for sets of up 
to 500 average homes, though trials are smaller. At present the Local Energy Company model 
is available only with a licensed retail supplier and prosumers cannot switch supplier and stay 
with the Local Energy Company.  
In the P2P example, Business Model #10, individual prosumers can trade excess generation, 
storage etc with neighbours to maximize self-consumption and respond to internal market 
preferences. These may conflict with overall market signals, but the preferences of individuals 
in the prosumer community can be automated on a trading platform. The peer to peer 
platform’s value is in reducing the transaction costs otherwise borne by suppliers or grid 
operators. 
Aggregator Business Models #12 and #13 enable prosumer communities to secure a ‘new’ 
revenue stream by demand side participation in flexibility markets. This means some level of 
automation is needed by the aggregator and some form of flexible asset like batteries, heat 
sinks, or interruptible appliances are needed as opposed to microgeneration alone. 
Aggregators might find prosumer communities a good partner but may also contract directly 
with individual households.  
Business Model #14, the ESCO model, bundles deep retrofit/ new build homes and small 
businesses to high energy efficiency standards with installation of microgeneration and smart 
heating/appliances. By paying an energy service charge and guaranteeing the comfort of 
residents, the ESCO or a nominated supplier can optimize the model for market performance 
and serve both prosumers and the energy system. The most effective models rely on uniform 
housing stock and uniform tenancies to bring down costs and build scale. Business Model #15, 
the mobility service provider, similarly focusses on cross vector energy services but begins to 
roll in transport electrification. The attractiveness of this model may be underplayed by this 
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investigation simply because of the early market stages of other enabling business models for 
extending self-consumption beyond a single meter point.  
These business models each have characteristics distinct to the market, resources, and 
regulations of each MS. However, they each address common issues of extending prosumerism 
beyond individual households and small businesses into different forms of collective self-
consumption. Some of these models avoid taxes, wholesale costs, transaction and supplier 
costs and network charges, some earn new revenues, and some bundle in new energy vectors. 
They solve the problems of system stakeholders in diverse ways. In the following discussion we 
explore how well different models respond to the key principles of prosumerism that were 
established in our UK pilot study and presented in Brown et al (201931).  
 
4. How do prosumer business models align with 
the 10 key principles of prosumerism?  
The 10 key principles of prosumerism set out in section 2.1 and developed by the authors in 
Brown et al (2019)31are designed for prosumer business models that hope to ‘mainstream’ with 
least disruption to the current regime. We question this more closely in Section 5 but here we 
assume the best way to mainstream prosumer business models into the current European 
energy ‘regime’ is to do so without fundamentally undermining how other parts of the system 
operate.  
Principle 1. Prosumer business models should deliver bi-directional value propositions 
that are synergistic to both prosumers and the energy system. 
 
We have organized our analysis around the problems prosumer business models solve for 
prosumers. However, throughout the report we have shown that prosumers can either 
exacerbate or reduce problems for other stakeholders in the energy system. When it comes to 
the problems that MS face, i.e. energy system decarbonisation, all of the models above solve 
this problem to a degree. The reason MS are reducing or eliminating subsidies for prosumer 
scale renewables, however, is that prosumers are some way off the most efficient use of public 
subsidy if grid decarbonisation is the only goal.  
 
Larger utility scale renewables projects are able to attract more public subsidy because they 
produce more low carbon electricity per Euro than small scale distributed schemes. Only 
business models #14 and #15 have the potential, if subsidised, to drive deeper forms 
decarbonisation because they support decarbonisation of other, harder to reach energy 
vectors. If the only value proposition prosumer business models bring to MS is cleaner energy, 
they are unlikely to persuade policymakers to re-introduce feed in style support.  
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Principle 2. Greater value can be created and captured through models that deliver 
services across multiple energy vectors. 
 
The only prosumer business models we found that explicitly cross into the heat and transport 
sectors were the ESCO and Mobility Service Provider models. Aggregator models #12 and #13 
benefit greatly from heat sinks or vehicle batteries in which to place excess local or wholesale 
generation, however they are not premised on growing those sectors. The complexity of 
making small scale collective self-consumption work in business models #3-#11, suggests that 
even where a compelling business case may exist for cross vector business models, transaction 
costs and information barriers may restrain any possibility to mainstream.   
 
Principle 3. Prosumer business models create non-financial value that is important but 
difficult to measure.  
 
Our exploration of the different stakeholder logics at play in section 1.2.2 suggest that the 
market logic of the Clean Energy Package exposes a tension between the not for profit 
governance structures of the RECs and CECs, and the for-profit governance structures of 
corporate utilities and other actors. The not-for profit sector has to enter a market where all of 
the incentives are monetized, priced and exchanged. In this way prosumers can express their 
preferences for local low carbon power in the ‘Peer to Peer’ model #10, by setting higher price 
tolerances on their automated trading platforms for things they value, like the ‘closet’ or the 
‘greenest’ power.  
 
Other values are secured by prosumers however, they include solidarity economies, local 
economic development, ecological protection, self-governance, and building of social 
networks and associations21. In later PROSEU deliverables, we will explore these incentives, but 
here we focus on those value streams that can be monetized to support a business model. We 
do this because we are adopting the framing of the Clean Energy Package that establishes 
electricity as a simple commodity. Something which can and “should” be exchanged in free 
markets. This means that while these more complex non-financial values are more difficult to 
measure, they are also subordinated when they are exchanged in a market because they are 
non-market values10. By enclosing, pricing and exchanging values like ‘ecological 
consciousness’ and ‘self-governance’ in a peer to peer business model, something which 
animated prosumer communities in the first instance can be lost163. We pick this up in Section 
5 when we explore prosumerism as a more consciously disruptive force to the current energy 
regime.  
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Principle 4. Prospective prosumers are likely to value simplicity over control of their 
energy systems. Prosumer business models should emphasise the customer journey in 
their design.  
 
The Mieterstrom, Postcoderoos, and Auto-consumption models each require some form of 
active opt-in from collective prosumers but much of the administration is dealt with beyond 
the individual by an energy company. The Peer to Peer model requires much closer 
engagement and sustained interest, particularly if it is to escape the trial phase and manage 
the risks of fatigue and declining interest common to time of use pricing trials. Managing 
consumer’s exposure to risk, particularly in Aggregator business models, is a key factor of 
enabling business model innovation164. Finally, the depth of disruption experienced by 
consumers undertaking deep retrofit, as in the ESCO, model, means that consumer trust and 
realistic building performance guarantees will define the success of the model. While the Clean 
Energy Package ensures consumers rights are protected, the consumer journey and consumer 
information will need to become a key part of business model design for all forms of collective 
self-consumption.  
 
 
Principle 5. Despite delivering greater decentralisation, prosumer business models still 
rely on the existing energy value chain and therefore must contribute to its upkeep. 
 
In most of the collective prosumption business models outlined above there is some form of 
revenue or saving obtained by extending the definition of self-consumption beyond an 
individual household. This may come from lower taxation, some avoidance of network charges, 
or avoidance of utilities’ costs and wholesale power prices. These elements together make up 
the retail price. Models that depend on the avoidance of network charges are unsustainable 
because they are unlikely to be avoiding costs ‘dynamically’ and are avoiding socialized 
payments for fixed elements of network costs.  
 
By exploring each prosumer business model in turn, we can understand how each builds a 
revenue model based not only on the subsidies they attract, but on which parts of the energy 
value chain they contribute to. This allows us to identify what hidden subsidies or new revenues 
they can access. Only then can we have a policy discussion about which of these value streams 
can or should be protected by MS regulators165.  
 
Principle 6. New prosumer business models can improve their revenue streams in four 
key ways:  
 
• Increase self-consumption behind the meter  
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All prosumer business models #3-#15 seek to increase and/or optimize self-consumption 
‘behind’ the meter. Business models #3-#7 did so by combining several meter points in 
collective prosumer models which extend the definition of self-consumption to the community 
or neighbourhood scale. Business models 3-7 are primarily based on increased ‘self’ 
consumption and do little to achieve better exported prices, deliver flexibility or shift energy 
vectors.   
 
• Achieve improved prices for exported power 
 
The Peer to Peer Business Model #10 changes the prices individuals can attain for exported 
power by allowing other users to pay premiums for local generation. The Regional Electricity 
Tariffs, Business Model #11 are not strictly prosumer models, but do allow direct collective 
consumption of renewables by allowing members of an energy co-operative to buy energy 
from the installations they finance. The Local Energy Company business models #8 and #9 aim 
to optimize the local exchange of power and therefore do increase the export potential for 
individuals in the collective.  
 
 
• Access flexibility, balancing and ancillary service markets  
 
Local Energy Company business models #8 and #9 can benefit somewhat from flexibility by 
giving prosumers dynamic price incentives to use networks and wholesale energy during low 
price periods. Local Energy models however are not immanently entering ancillary service 
markets. Aggregator Business Models #12 and #13 are fundamentally about accessing 
flexibility service markets using automated demand side management.  
 
 
• Shift energy vectors 
 
While aggregator business models #12 and #13 benefit from electric vehicle battery storage 
or electrified heat as energy sinks for demand response, their primary goal is not shifting 
energy vectors. Recent work has shown that shifting energy vectors away from liquid fuels for 
transport, and gaseous fuels for heat, creates a substantial pool of new value which new 
business models can pursue33. Business Model #13 the Energy Service Company and Business 
Model #14 the Mobility Service Provider seek to exploit this new value while at the same time 
optimizing self-consumption. As yet the deep retrofit ESCO model has not been linked with 
any aggregator model to benefit from flexibility markets.   
 
Principle 7. Prosumer business models need to be effectively remunerated through 
reduced UoS charges, if they create value for distribution and transmission network 
infrastructure 
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Any business model with either time of use pricing or dynamic response i.e. Business Models 
#8-#13 can theoretically solve problems of network congestion for distribution system 
operators (DSOs). However, with the market for distribution level flexibility in its infancy98, it 
may be some time before collective prosumers can reliably calculate the value of this servie. It 
will also be location specific, in that it will depend on prosumers being able to solve problems 
where they exist geographically, which is uneven.  
 
Principle 8. Business models solely based on avoiding network charges are likely to be 
unsustainable long term – as they violate 1 and 5 
 
The Council of European Energy Regulators has made clear that in transposing the Clean 
Energy Package into National Regulation that regulators should be very cautious of allowing 
collective prosumer models to thrive that rely on network charge avoidance. This avoidance is 
unsustainable as it is likely to load costs onto lower income or less agile network customers4. 
Moves to more dynamic cost reflexive charging across EU MS are likely to undermine any such 
business case.  
 
 
Principle 9. Business models that involve the provision of flexibility services need access 
to these markets and should be remunerated through payments or reduced charges. 
 
The provisions in the Clean Energy Package ensure MS regulators open up the markets for 
flexibility to much more varied actors in the short to medium term3. Where prosumer 
communities are concerned, there is a potential to optimize collective assets and earn new 
revenue streams that were unavailable previously. At the same time there is no barrier to 
commercial firms signing up consumers with smart appliances and electric heating/vehicles 
onto aggregator tariffs. It remains to be seen whether incentives for self-consumption and 
requests for ancillary services will compete with each other, and whether the complexity of 
trying to make both work together will lead prosumer communities to choose either self-
consumption led models or flexibility led models.  
 
Principle 10. Community, municipal and market logics are all a feature of the prosumer 
phenomenon – based on a range of competing ‘normativities’ and visions of the future, 
these governance logics should be made explicit.  
All of the business models investigated here are presented with flows of information and 
transactions around the energy system. By representing business models in this way, we are 
showing only the element of the energy system that a market logic can ‘see’. Flows of data, 
energy, payments, and services can be monetized, they are costs or revenues depending on 
where in the system one sits. What cannot be seen using the business model component 
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diagrams are other motivations. By calling for ‘explicit’ recognition of the different value logics 
involved in creating prosumer communities, we seek to uncover tensions between these 
business models and the existing regime. This is the focus of the following section.  
In summary, business models #1-#15 all interact with their host energy system in different ways 
and fulfil some but not all of the key principles of prosumersim. The business models most 
likely to thrive within the current regime are those which contribute to system upkeep and are 
unlikely to be regulated away or disappear when overt or hidden subsidies disappear. At the 
same time there are other motivations beyond ‘growing a business’ that apply to prosumerism 
that motivate the establishment of prosumer communities in the first place.  
5. Mainstreaming ‘collective’ models in a 
competitive market 
The three fields of academic theory we use to frame our analysis show us three things. First, 
the socio-technical transitions field allows us to see prosumers and prosumer communities as 
a ‘niche’ that is trying to grow into an energy regime, which is currently composed of much 
larger corporate utilities that are themselves in competition for market share. Secondly, our 
multi actor perspective allows us to ‘see’ how the Clean Energy Package adopts a 
predominantly market logic. It seeks to build a set of regulating institutions that can price and 
exchange all the ‘values’ associated with electricity, from basic payment per unit of energy, to 
dynamic and cost reflective rewards for smart flexibility. Third, we can use a business model 
generation approach to characterise the business models that are being generated and 
extrapolate from them how they might interact with the rest of the energy system using a co-
evolutionary perspective. This means we can see the business models that are forming the 
‘niche’ of collective prosumerism, and explore how this niche might be empowered to enter 
the mainstream or regime.  
Expanding collective prosumerism, however, exposes an unresolved tension within the Clean 
Energy Package, specifically the REDII2 and Common Rules for the Internal Market for 
Electricity3. Both Directives define and make space for the establishment of Renewable Energy 
Communities (RECs) and Citizen Energy Communities (CECs) as legal entities. These entities are 
to have for their “primary purpose to provide environmental, economic or social community 
benefits to [their] members or shareholders or to the local areas where [they] operat[e] rather 
than to generate financial profits”3.      
It is worth questioning why such entities might be necessary if one was really to trust that an 
open, free market for electricity would lead to all the societal efficiencies baked into the idea 
of a flexible cost reflective energy system for all citizens. One explanation might be that the 
politics of energy transitions are much more fraught than a dispassionate business model 
analysis might suggest166,167,168.   
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To be explicit, some forms of collective prosumerism169, community energy170, co-operative 
energy171, and civic energy172 are fundamentally about organising against an unbundled free 
market approach to delivering energy systems and an energy transition. As such, exploring 
these business models as though their primary purpose was to support the existing regime 
and compete with it on a level playing field is naïve. In reality there are two forms of prosumer 
niche, one that seeks to construct a business model that can compete in a relatively unchanged 
energy market, and one that seeks to change the rules of that market to favour prosumer 
business models over the current regime dominated by large corporate utilities.   
This has implications for our research question: What prosumer business models are emerging 
across Europe, how do they work and what problems do they solve for multiple actors i.e. 
prosumers, governments and the energy system? 
We have answered the first part of our research question by detailing 15 business models for 
prosumerism across Europe. We have shown these business models have varying abilities to 
solve problems for prosumers; enabling them to generate, consume and sell renewable energy. 
They deal with problems of subsidy reductions by extending self-consumption, benefitting 
from flexibility, and decarbonizing other energy vectors. Some models also solve problems for 
other actors in the energy system, predominantly by making flexibility available to system 
operators.  
 
These business models fulfil some or all of the ten principles we outline for prosumerism. They 
require what Smith and Raven (2012163) call ‘fit and conform’ niche empowerment. “Fit and 
conform empowerment makes the niche innovation competitive with mainstream socio-
technical practices in otherwise unchanged [selection] environments” The drive in the Clean 
Energy Package is therefore to bring consumers, prosumers, and demand side response into 
the ‘logic’ of the single energy market32. The Clean Energy Package has created pressure on 
MS regulators to ‘level the playing field’ for RECs and CECs, so they may participate in energy 
exchange and demand response programmes. In this way the Clean Energy Package can be 
understood as ‘fit and conform’ niche empowerment.  
 
However as Smith and Raven also note: “there is always pressure for sustainable innovations 
to become competitive on the more narrow economic, technological, organisational and other 
criteria of existing markets, compared to the broader sustainability values that might originally 
have motivated the innovative effort163”. This concern should be reflected against earlier work 
by the PROSEU consortium which shows the motivations for establishing these initiatives are 
predominantly ecological and social, reliant on community empowerment and association 
logics as opposed to market logics and revenue optimization15. 
 
These broader sustainability values may be at the heart of the non-profit principles adopted 
by RECs and CECs. Consequently, fit and conform niche empowerment is likely to be insufficient 
to allow RECs and CECs to thrive. A different form of niche empowerment may be needed. 
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Smith and Raven’s second form of niche empowerment is ‘stretch and transform’. If 
policymakers adopt a ‘stretch and transform’ approach they often do so as a result of political 
pressure from outside the regime165. Pressure external to the regime is necessary because 
empowering these more disruptive niches means undermining incumbent power structures 
and committing to reforms that transmit different value logics into current institutions163. Using 
our co-evolutionary understanding of energy systems change, this means MS regulators re-
writing energy market regulation to specifically protect the niche of collective prosumer 
business models. This is a more active form of empowerment than simply allowing them to co-
opt and replicate a miniaturized or digitalised energy market logics at the neighbourhood 
scale.  
Of all of the business models exploredxxv in the ‘post subsidy’ landscape, only the Postcoderoos 
model (Business Model #5) is an example of stretch and conform niche empowerment. This is 
because it is the only example where the co-operative or resident’s association is the only legal 
form that can benefit from the tax incentive in the model. It is the only example of a concrete 
revenue advantage that a corporate or private company cannot access. In the Mieterstrom 
model, landlord energy companies can be run by corporate utilities. In the Collective Auto 
Consumption Model, there is no requirement for a non-profit legal form (though individuals 
benefit together). In the UKs Local Energy Companies and Private wire networks, there is no 
barrier to for profit participation. Neither ESCO’s nor Aggregators, nor Mobility Service 
Providers need be non-profit. All apart from the Postcoderoos model can operate on a market 
logic in the ‘fit and conform’ space for growing prosumer niches in national energy systems.  
MS regulators who are tasked with transposing the Clean Energy Package into national system 
regulation therefore have critical questions to answer. Are the business models that collective 
prosumers adopt to be empowered by ‘fit and conform’ type regulation, where ‘barriers to 
entry’ are removed? Or are they to be empowered by ‘stretch and conform’ type regulation, 
where their wider “environmental, economic or social community benefits3” are recognised and 
supported? If collective prosumer business models are to thrive, we need, as in the 
Postcoderoos model, to establish what it is that Renewable Energy Communities (RECs) and 
Citizens Energy Communities (CECs) can do, that a private for profit company in the energy 
system cannot do.   
6. Conclusion 
Prosumers across the European Union are seeking new ways of extending prosumerism beyond 
individual households and businesses. They are using a series of national variations in energy 
law and regulation to extend the definition of self-consumption beyond single meter points. 
To do this they rely on either, avoiding some element of the retail price and sharing this benefit 
 
xxv Bearing in mind this research sampled only seven participating Member States 
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between participants, finding new revenues from flexibility, or decarbonising other energy 
vectors.  
We have explored a diverse set of business models both to understand the flows of value within 
them and to establish how compatible they are with the 10 ‘key principles of prosumerism’. 
Business models based on extending the definition of self-consumption to neighbourhoods or 
multi occupancy buildings fulfil more of these key principles of prosumerism than individual 
subsidy dependent models. More contributions are made to system charges, and they enrol a 
more diverse set of actors into prosumerism and the energy transition.  
As they seek broader revenues, however, they need to solve problems for other system 
stakeholders. The more a business model expands into capturing flexibility revenues and 
decarbonising other energy vectors, the more complex it tends to be. This complexity increases 
the need to invite other stakeholders into partnership, such as peer to peer platform providers, 
aggregators or larger energy service companies (ESCOs). Where this is the case there may be 
a tension between the community value logic of some RECs and CECs and the commercial 
logic of partners.  
For MS regulators, managing this tension between pure market actors and RECs and CECs 
means drafting regulation that explicitly shows where simple ‘barriers to entry’ are being 
removed, and where RECs and CECs/collective prosumer are being specifically empowered to 
do something a commercial entity is unable to do. In the analysis above, the only explicit 
example of this is the Postcoderoos model whereby predominantly co-operatives and 
Residents Associations can access the tax incentive of collective self-consumption. In other 
models, the need for close local engagement and small-scale organisational forms may lead 
to mutual and not for profit governance structures being preferred. However, if MS regulators 
are to specifically empower RECs and CECs, they have two sets of options. These are shown in 
Table 5: 
Table 5: Two streams of policy options for empowering the prosumer niche 
 
‘Fit and Conform’ policy options for 
empowerment of the Market Prosumer Niche: 
‘Stretch and Transform’ policy options for the 
Collective Prosumer Niche: 
Focus on opening up balancing, ancillary 
services and capacity markets to smaller scale 
demand side response. 
Focus on opening up balancing, ancillary services 
and capacity markets to smaller scale demand 
side response and reserve a portion of each 
auction for REC and CEC participation.  
Create an export guarantee that obliges retail 
suppliers to offer a price above zero for 
energy exported to the grid.  
Create an export guarantee that obliges retail 
suppliers to offer a price above zero for energy 
exported to the grid. 
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Experiment with derogations from supplier 
licensing under certain power ratings for all 
stakeholders.  
Experiment with derogations from supplier 
licensing under certain power ratings only for 
RECs and CECs 
Allow peer to peer platforms to operate 
without supplier license requirements when 
partnered with a licensed utility.  
Allow peer to peer platforms and Local Energy 
Companies to operate without supplier license 
requirements when partnered with a licensed 
utility. 
Expose prosumers to full costs of network 
utilisation  
Maintain limited protection from full costs of 
network utilisation 
Create a specific scheme for shared self-
consumption in multi-occupancy buildings or 
in very local geographies that benefits from 
tax incentives or explicitly justifies avoidance 
of network charges or supplier costs.  
Create a specific scheme for shared self-
consumption in multi-occupancy buildings or in 
very local geographies that benefits from tax 
incentives or explicitly justifies avoidance of 
network charges or supplier costs. where only 
REC and CEC organisational forms can operate 
the scheme 
 Re-establish explicit subsidies for prosumers 
where the prosumer business model used 
includes other, hard to decarbonise energy 
vectors such as heat or transport.  
 
To grow the collective prosumer niche in the European Union, more explicit protection and 
empowerment beyond simply ‘levelling the playing field’ will be necessary. The policy options 
offered under ‘stretch and transform’ retain the spirit of market participation and cost 
reflectivity without placing RECs and CECs into direct competition with commercial utilities 
operating only a market logic. As such, the niche can be empowered beyond what an 
innovative commercial utility would achieve.  
To be explicit: the only justification for this approach is if MS regulators are incentivised to go 
beyond the ideas that well-functioning, competitive markets are the best way to achieve 
societal and environmental outcomes.  This would mean recognising that energy markets are 
sometimes unpredictable and have to manage difficult distributional outcomes that RECs and 
CECs may be well placed to adapt to and address. Issues such as fuel poverty, inactive 
consumers, and poorly insulated building stocks are as much a product of the current market 
framework as a smart and efficient market for flexibility services. Growing the REC/ CEC niche 
may mean sacrificing some level of price efficiency in the short term to better establish a 
substantive bottom up and citizen led portion of the energy regime, which is better suited to 
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deliver both efficient energy services as well as other socio-economic and environmental 
outcomes.  
The future of prosumerism as mainstreaming citizen participation in the energy transition may 
be largely dependent on the ability of system regulators to make space for a set of value logics 
which have been antithetical to market regulation practices to date. 
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